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[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN A~TI FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

0
::0

Case No. CV 08-327

MEMORI\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
NICHOLAS BOKIDES' MOTION TO
AMEND ANSWER

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIA_M R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants.
ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.
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COMES NOW the Third-Party Defendant, l\icholas Bokides, by and through
undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Rules 15( a) and l 5(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure and other applicable law, hereby moves this Court for an Order granting him leave to
amend his Answer to include an affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore has brought a legal malpractice action against
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides.

the parties have already submitted extensive

briefing to the Court by way of dispositive motions, Third-Party Defendant will not reiterate all
of the relevant facts and circumstances that give rise to this litigation, but rather, will focus on
the narrow legal issue that is the subject of this motion.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure l 5(a) governs amendments to the pleadings. Rule
15(a) states in part "a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires ... " The Idaho
Supreme Court has stated:
The twin purposes behind the rule are to allow claims to be
determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of
the claim and the
at issue.
It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether
to allow a party to amend its complaint after a responsive pleading
has been served. "[I]n the interest of justice, district courts should
of
to amend a complaint."
favor liberal

Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 1

Idaho 866,871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202

( 1999) (citations omitted).
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure l 5(b) states:

lVIEMORL\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS
BOKIDES' MOTION TO AMEND ANS\VER
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Client 17 43252.1

Rule 15(6 ). Amendments to conform to the evidence.-- When
issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
The decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a pleading is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997). In deciding
whether to grant a motion for leave to amend, a trial court may consider whether the amended
pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by any undue
delay, or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim. Black
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d

900, 904 (1991 ).
While a court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added state a
valid claim, the court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether leave
should be granted. Thomas v. Med Ctr. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200,210, 61 P.3d 557 (2002)
( citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175,
804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991); Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 873, 993
P.2d 1197, 1203 (1999).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS
BOKIDES' MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
-3
Client 17 43252 1

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS TIMELY AND DOES NOT
UNDULY PREJUDICE THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF.
Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c), a party must set forth in his pleading

any affirmative defenses to the other party's pleading. "The purpose of this rule requiring that
affirmative defenses be pleaded is to alert the parties about the issues of fact that will be tried and
to afford them an opportunity to present evidence to meet these defenses." Nguyen v. Bui, 146
Idaho 187, 191 (2008). While Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 8( c) requires a party to set forth in
it's pleading any affirmative defenses to the other party's pleading, "I.R.C.P. 15(6) modifies the
requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(c)." Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 492 (1996). Rules 15(a) and
15(6) clearly provide that when justice requires, a party may move to amend its pleading at any
time. Rule 15(6) directs the court to look at whether the presentation of the merits of the case
would be subserved by failure to allow the amendment, and whether the party opposing the
amendment would be prejudiced in the presentation of his case.
Although Third-Party Defendant's Answer did not specifically raise the
affomative defense of failure to mitigate damages, the factual allegations supporting the
affirmative defense are set forth in the Answer. These allegations are well known to the ThirdParty Plaintiff, and have already been the subject of extensive briefing to the Court by way of
dispositive motions, by both parties 1. Additionally, the Court in its July 29, 2010 Memorandum

1

The affirmative defense that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages was first
raised by Third-Party Defendant in his March 10, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment and
subsequently argued in Roberta Shore's March 24, 2010 Response and Opposition to Third-Party
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In his June 10, 2010 response to Roberta Shore's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Third-Party Defendant again raised the affirmative defense that
Roberts Shore's claims should be denied because she failed to mitigate her damages by pursuing
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Decision and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment addressed whether Third-Party
Defendant was entitled to summary judgment for Roberta Shore's failure to mitigate damages.
Finally, the Joint Pre-trial Stipulation, submitted jointly by both parties, identifies whether
Roberta Shore mitigated her damages as an issues of law to be litigated at trial.
A review of the record shows that the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate
was clear and that Third-Party Plaintiff was aware of the issue and consented to the issue being
tried. See Nguyen at 191; Keller Lorenz Company, Inc. v. Insurance Associates Corporation, 98
Idaho 678, 682 (1977). While the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages was not
raised with specificity in the Third-Party Defendant's Answer, the issue has been clearly tried by
the consent of the parties. Accordingly, the addition of this affirmative defense at this time will
not unduly prejudice the Third-Party Plaintiff's ability to prepare for, or prosecute, their case at
trial, nor will it delay the trial which is currently scheduled for August 24-26, 2010. Justice is
served by allowing Third-Party Defendant to add the affirmative defense.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Third-Party Defendant respectfully requests that the
Court grant his Motion to Amend Answer, and allow Third-Party Defendant leave to amend his
Answer to include the additional affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages.

her claims against Bill Shore. In her June 14, 2010 Reply Memorandum, Roberta Shore again
argued that the duty to mitigate did not require her to file a complaint against her ex-husband.
The issue was also argued before the Court at the hearing on both motions for summary
judgment.
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DATED this J}j_ day of August, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK

&

FIELDS, CHARTERED

/8.,(~

By

Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
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the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Steven R. Fuller
R. FULLER LAW OFFICE
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Preston, ID 83262
Attorney for Plaintiff
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( ) Overnight Mail
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Attorneys/or Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

STEVE!\

Chm11bers Copy

Bradley J Williams

MEMORi\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS
BOKIDES' MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
-7
Client 17 43252.1

53~

FILE@

JAIVIES G. REID, ISB #1372
LAURA E. BURRI, ISB #3573
RII\JGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 S. Tl1ird, P. 0. BOX 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Attorneys for Defendants

, td:gp - 7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AI\ID FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

*

*
*

MCCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation

)

case No. cv 08-327

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation, WILLIAM R. SHORE an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

------- -- -- ---- ----- ------------------- -- -- -------------------------- )
)

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,

)
)

Third-Party Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

THIRD-PARTY PLAII\ITIFF'S FINAL ARGUMENT - 1

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S
FINAL ARGUMENT

AH II: 59

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual,
Tl1ird-Partv Defendant.

*
*
*

INTRODUCTION
Prior to the commencement of the Court trial, summary judgment motions were
filed, briefed and argued to the Court. Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter
referred to as "Roberta") does not believe it is necessary to repeat the arguments made
in conjunction with the various summary judgment motions, but will confine her written
argument to the application of facts presented at trial to the law as it pertains to the
issues in this case. Simply stated, the Third Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides
(hereinafter "Bokides") failed to notify McCormick International and Agricredit within a
reasonable period of time after he was asked and agreed to provide written notification
that Roberta no longer wished to be a guarantor of Bear River Equipment's obligations.
Had Bok ides acted within a reasonable period of time after he was asked and agreed to
provide such notifications, Roberta would not have been a Defendant in this action.
Bokides freely admitted during cross examination that if he made the notifications he
was requested to do prior to the end of October, 2006, Roberta would never have been
named as a party by McCormick in this litigation. He failed to produce any rational,
cogent explanation for his dilatory conduct resulting in her having a judgment rendered
against her in the sum of $342,417.42 in her capacity as guarantor of Bear River
Equipment.

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S FII\JAL ARGUMENT- 2

Roberta had personal knowledge of her ex-husband, William Shore's, assets
and liabilities as of the date of their divorce (November 16, 2006) and, subsequent
thereto, as a result of numerous claims brought against herself and 1\/lr. Shore, in
addition to McCormick, by various creditors of Bear River Equipment, including the IRS,
the State of Idaho, Krone Equipment, Ireland Bank, Blake Adkins, and the law firm of
Merrill & Merrill. Given her personal knowledge of the efforts and the settlements
entered into with respect to these various creditors, this Court should not fault her for
electing not to pursue William Shore via a third party claim in this case, assuming, for
the sake of argument, she even had the legal right to do so. It was not unreasonable
for Roberta to conclude that pursuing William Shore would not only be costly for her,
but she would have no assurances that a third party complaint against him, even if
successful, would result in her obtaining any money. As such, she did not fail to
mitigate her damages by not pursuing William Shore.
ARGUMENT

I.

Bokides' liability is virtually unchallenged.

At trial, Bokides admitted that Roberta probably told him to send the letters to
McCormick and Agricredit by at least May, 2006. He further admitted that had he done
so by October of 2006, she would not be involved in this lawsuit. The defense, in prior
submissions, has already admitted that seven of the eight tractors which form the basis
of McCormick's claim against Bear River Equipment and, subsequently, William Shore
and Roberta, were floored after the divorce decree was entered on November 16, 2006,
and only one tractor was floored prior to the divorce, and that was in October, 2006.
Initially, Mr. Bokides claimed that Bobbie brought him letters that she wanted him
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S FII\JAL ARGUIVIENT- 3

5?15

to send to McCormick and Agricredit. At trial, he admitted that this was incorrect. He
also claimed that he was concerned as to whether or not removing her as a guarantor
during the pendency of the divorce would affect Bear River Equipment's business
relationship with Agricredit or McCormick, yet he admitted that he did not contact either
Agricredit or McCormick to see if her removal would affect their business relationships
with Bear River. He provided no cogent explanation as to why it would be a good idea
to wait until after the divorce was final for him to notify McCormick and Agricredit. He
agreed that if a person came to see him for divorce and had credit cards, his advice to
that person would be to immediately notify the credit card companies so as to avoid
liability for additional charges. This is no different than notifying Agricredit and
McCormick that Roberta no longer wanted to be a guarantor. Once this notification was
accomplished, any debts incurred by Bear River after the notification would not be
subject to her guarantee. In this case, ALL of the debts incurred by Bear River for
which Roberta's guarantee applied were incurred after the divorce decree was entered
or, in one case, shortly before. However, Bokides had a period of time, at least five
months, in which he could have notified McCormick and Agricredit and eliminated
Roberta's obligations under her guarantees completely.
Bokides further provided no evidence of any discussion he had with Roberta in
which she supposedly agreed to wait until after the divorce was entered to be removed
as a guarantor on Bear River's obligation to McCormick and Agricredit (see Exhibit
114). At trial, he acknowledged that she "probably" told him to send the letters to
McCormick and Agricredit at least by May of 2006, which testimony completely refutes
his earlier position that she did not ask him to be removed as a guarantor until after the
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divorce was final.
What is clear from Bokides' testimony in this proceeding is that he has changed
his story concerning the underlying facts throughout this case and, when push comes to
shove, could not deny or provide any corroboration for his various versions of the facts,
nor could he cogently refute Roberta's clear unequivocal testimony concerning when
she asked him to perform his tasks and whether or not she agreed to wait until after the
divorce was over. Instead, his defense primarily consisted of a "blame the victim"
strategy by chastising Roberta for not pursuing William Shore in order to relieve himself
of having to compensate her for the damage he inflicted, which, by his own testimony,
could absolutely have been avoided.
II.

Roberta acted reasonably in electing not to pursue William Shore.

Roberta was married to William Shore for 15 years. According to her testimony,
she was the marital bookkeeper. Unlike third party creditors, who by and large do not
have first hand independent knowledge of a debtor's assets, Roberta, as a marital
partner of William Shore, had full knowledge of both their assets and their liabilities.
She knew the extent of the personal assets they acquired and she knew what they paid
for their real property. Following their divorce, according to Roberta's uncontroverted
testimony, she had personal knowledge as to the claims made against Bear River
Equipment, by McCormick, Krone, Ireland Bank, the IRS, the State of Idaho, the law
firm of Merrill & Merrill, McCormick, Blake Adkins Law Firm and had first hand
knowledge of the manner, extent and methods by which the majority of these claims
were settled. She was also involved in the litigation with Tom Lewis, the general
manager of Bear River Equipment.

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S FINAL ARGUMENT - 5

531

When she was first served with the Complaint in this matter demanding payment
based upon her "personal guarantee" she acknowledged that she was informed by
undersigned counsel that if she wanted to pursue a claim against William Shore
pursuant to the indemnification provision of their divorce decree she would have to
obtain the services of different counsel as Ringert Law Chartered was representing
William Shore in this matter and could not represent Roberta in a claim against William
Shore. Based upon her personal knowledge of William Shore's assets, as well as his
liabilities, Roberta independently determined that it made no sense for her to assert a
claim against William Shore as it would involve an expenditure of funds by her that she
was not prepared to make and she saw very little and, in fact, no likelihood of actually
recovering anything of value assuming she even could legally bring such a claim.
Instead, she elected to retain Ringert Law Chartered to defend her against McCormick,
attempt settlement with McCormick and, if not, pursue her Third-Party Complaint
against Bokides as that, to her, was the most prudent cost effective course of action to
take. Her decision in this regard is now the subject of Monday morning quarterbacking
by Bokides. Considering she wouldn't have been placed in a position of having to
decide whether or not to pursue William Shore, but for Bokides' negligence, this
position is somewhat astounding.
William Shore, during discovery in this case, provided counsel for Bokides a
financial statement dated February of this year (Exhibit 113). At first blush, the financial
statement appears to show a net worth of approximately $230,000. However, in order
to arrive at this positive net worth, William Shore placed a value on the Council farm at
$1,625,000.000, the Preston property at $220,000.00 and various pieces of used farm
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machinery and equipment at more than $140,000.00. At trial, William Shore
acknowledged that his valuation of these assets was not based upon a forced sale or a
sale by a bankruptcy trustee, as would be the case if Roberta pursued him, obtained a
judgment, and then attempted execution. He informed the Court that the only offer he
had received for the Council property was in the sum of $900,000.00. He informed the
Court that he had not received any offer for his Preston property and that the
depreciated value of his farm equipment was minimal. Having first hand knowledge of
the purchase price of both the Preston and Council property (Exhibits 111 and 110),
first hand knowledge of the nature of the remaining farm machinery, first hand
knowledge of the claims both liquidated, as well as unliquidated, being made against
William Shore by his creditors (even assuming the IRS claim is only $94,000 as
opposed to $270,000.00 which William Shore believed), it is easy to understand how
Roberta believes that William Shore has an overwhelmingly negative net worth which
justifies her decision not to pursue him by way of a third party complaint.
Bokides questions why Roberta would not foreclose on her mortgage on the
Council property in order to obtain additional assets for herself. If she did this (she has
a first mortgage on the Council property in the sum of $1,300,000.00) then she would
subject herself to execution by McCormick for which it would place her in a position of
satisfying McCormick's judgment with little or no chance of recourse. The suggestion
therefore that she foreclose on her mortgage is unreasonable.
Notwithstanding the fact that a reasonable person, such as Roberta, could easily
conclude as an economic proposition pursuing William Shore makes no sense. there is
also a legal impediment to her pursuing William Shore that must be considered. It is
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S FINAL ARGUMENT - 7

true that the divorce decree between William Shore and Roberta requires him to
indemnify and hold her harmless from "all indebtedness related to the closely held
corporation, Bear River Equipment, Inc., including, but not limited to, any claims or
litigation against the parties arising out of the business operated by Bear River
Equipment, Inc. including attorney's fees and costs." However, as is crystal clear from
the language of the original Complaint, the claim against Roberta by McCormick in this
case is based upon her "personal guarantee", not upon an obligation arising from the
conduct of Bear River Equipment's business. If she had not signed the personal
guarantee, there would be no claim against Roberta by McCormick as a result of the
operation of Bear River Equipment's business. Roberta was nothing more than a
shareholder and officer in Bear River Equipment. Bokides presented absolutely no
evidence that she, as a shareholder, could be held responsible for Bear River debts.
McCormick itself did not sue Roberta based upon her status as a shareholder, but
based only on her status as "personal guarantor." As such, Bokides is not in a position
to provide assurances that even if Roberta were to have attempted to file a third party
complaint against William Shore, it would not have been dismissed based on lack of
standing.
At the end of Bokides' testimony, he was asked whether or not he considered
filing a third party complaint against William Shore himself. He stated he thought about
it, but didn't do it. It seems as though Bokides didn't feel it was worth pursuing William
Shore on his own behalf, but instead wants to chastise his victim, Roberta, for not doing
what he himself chose not to do. This position is, at best, disingenuous.
Finally, if Bokides thinks that it would be a benefit to pursue William Shore in
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order to mitigate the damages that he has caused by his negligence, then why doesn't
Bokides simply purchase the judgment McCormick has against Bill Shore from
McCormick and then execute against William Shore. The answer is obvious. Bokides
has not done this, nor will he do this, because he doesn't want to be placed in a
position of throwing good money after bad, but would rather have Roberta engage in
this speculative venture to save him money.
CONCLUSION
Bokides was negligent in not getting Roberta removed from her obligations under
her personal guarantees to Agricredit and McCormick. As a result of his negligence,
Roberta has been damaged in the sum of $342,417.42, together with interest thereon,
and the costs and attorney's fees she has incurred in both defending herself in the
underlying case and pursuing the Third-Party Complaint. Based on the facts and
circumstances of this case, she has not failed to mitigate her damages.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2010.

'/

RINGERT LAW efHARTER
f
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy
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Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fu lier Law Office
24 North state
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83262
Ed Cather
Moffatt, Thomas
P.O. Box 51505

Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1505
Honorable Mitchell w. Brown
District Judge
159 south Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Chambers Copy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
-~---

*
*
)
MCCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA.
)
I~ C .. a corporation
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
)
corporation. WILLIAM R. SHORE an
)
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
)
individual.
)
)
Defendants.
)
--------------------------------------------------------- )
)
ROBERTA SHORE an individual,
)
)
Third-Party Plaintiff,
)

Case No. CV 08-327

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S
POST-TRIAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

vs.

)
)

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual,

)

Third-Party Defendant.

)
)

*
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COMES NOW Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter"Roberta '' ), by and
through her attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby submits this Post -Trial
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law for the court trial held on August 24, 2010.

I. FINDI~GS OF FACT
A.

Liability.
(The first eight (8) findings of fact are from the Court's prior Memorandum Decision and

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment dated July 29. 2010).
1.

McCormick International USA Inc. (McCormick) is a manufacturer of farm

equipment. In order to market its equipment, McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships
\vith local. but independently owned dealers. In 2005. a dealership with Bear River Equipment, Inc.
( Bear River) was created for the retail sale of McCormick tractors and other farm equipment.
7

In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River

entered into agreements with Agricredit which were executed by William Shore (William) and
Roberta on behalf of Bear River. Bear River executed an "Inventory Security Agreement" and a
'·Retail Financing Agreement·· with Agricredit on March 22. 2005. As part of the Inventory Security
Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited pO\ver of attorney which provided Agricredit
with authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River, certain documents in the normal course of
business, including "Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm
equipment from McCormick, the equipment would be financed or floored through Agricredit.
Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed by Bear River through the use of the limited
power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to the customer, the proceeds of the sale \Vere to
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be placed in a trust account, separate and apart from Bear River's other funds.
3.

On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal

guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear
River to Agricredit.
4.

In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling

equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply said
proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to place said monies in a trust account as required by the
agreements with Agricredit.
5.

McCormick and Agricredit had entered into an agreement wherein McCormick

agreed to pay Agricredit for the amounts financed to McCormick's dealers if Agricredit was unable
to collect monies it had paid to dealers for the purchase or flooring of McCormick equipment. By
assignment dated March 14,2008, Agricredit transfe1Ted to McCormick all of its right title and
interest to the obligation owed by Bear River to Agricredit. The personal guarantees referenced in
paragraph 3 were part of the all-inclusive rights assigned to McCormick.
6.

The Guaranty signed by Roberta contained the following provision:
And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall
have received at its Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor
or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of the
Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this
guaranty.

7.

On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William and

Roberta in their individual capacities. McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20,2010.
McCormick's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted June 10, 2010. See Minute Entry and
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Order dated June 10,2010. Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta on June
29. 2010 in the sum of $319,977.98. See Judgment and Order against Bear River Equipment, Inc.,
William R. Shore and Roberta Shore.
8.

The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from

the sale of the equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the Agreements between
Bear River and Agricredit. The Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized as
follows:
Serial No.

Model No.

Date Financed

JJE2026767

MCl 15 Tractor

10/23/06

JJE3337250

MTX 13 5 Tractor

12/21/06

JJE3337193

MTX 120 Tractor

12/21/06

7183970

MCQLl 45 Loader

12/21/06

JJE2059356

CX105 Tractor

1/04/07

JJE2058843

CX85 Tractor

3/15007

7217799

MCQLl 65 Loader

5/29/07

7217796

MCQL165 Loader

5/29/07

See Affidavit of Kevin Peters and Exhibit C through G.

9.

On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded and an Amended

Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42. See
Amended Judgment.
10.

In March of 2006, Roberta engaged the services of Bokides to represent her in a

divorce proceeding in Washington County, Idaho, Shore v. Shore Case No. CV 2006-000368.
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Roberta advised Bokides of the above-referenced personal guarantee and Bokides agreed to notify,
in writing, Agricredit that Roberta would no longer be a guarantor for the obligations of Bear
River Equipment, Inc. While there has been some dispute around this issue prior to trial, it was
clear at trial that even Bokides acknowledged that Roberta asked him to send the letters prior to
~fay of 2006.

11.

The evidence is undisputed that Bokides did not send the letters he promised to send

to Agricredit revoking Roberta's personal guarantee. Bokides did not contact McCormick or
Agricredit to determine if removing Roberta's personal guarantee would negatively impact Bear
River Equipment. Inc. 's ability to obtain financing in the future. Further, Bokides did not dispute
that had he sent the letters Roberta would not be a party to this action, McCormick/ Agri-Credit
would not have obtained the above-referenced Judgment against her, and Roberta would not have
incurred costs and expenses in defending the underlying claims.

B.

Mitigation of Damages.
12.

Bokides suggests that Roberta failed to mitigate her damages by failing to bring a

cause of action against William Shore. At the time the cause of action was brought against
Roberta, she met with attorney James G. Reid to discuss her options.

She was advised of a

potential conflict and a waiver of that conflict was obtained from both Roberta and William.
Roberta independently determined not to make a claim against William based upon her personal
knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and net worth.
13.

Roberta, having been married to William, was aware of the assets, liabilities,

judgments and pending lawsuits of William. It is undisputed that Roberta was also aware of those
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same assets, liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits after the divorce. In fact, Roberta was
a party to some of the lawsuits and continues to have a security interest in some of the assets of
William.
14.

The Divorce Decree (Exhibit 103), does not specifically state that William will

indemnify Roberta for her obligations pursuant to her personal guarantees.

The Divorce Decree

provides at paragraph VI that William will indemnify Roberta for "indebtedness related to the
closely held corporation Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc."
15.

As to William's assets, it is undisputed that William has a negative net worth and

William may have to file bankruptcy at some point in the future. The Financial Statement dated
February 26. 2010 (Exhibit 113) does not include the above-mentioned Judgment of
McCormick/ Agri-Credit.

William's testimony was that the value of the assets listed on the

Financial Statement if sold pursuant to executions would be significantly less than the amounts
listed. There was a suggestion at trial that William had offered to settle the suit with McCormick
for $100.000.00 but the undisputed testimony was that William would have to borrow the money
to accomplish a settlement.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Roberta requested and Bokides agreed to notify Agricredit in writing on Roberta's

behalf that Roberta would no longer guarantee Bear River Equipment, Inc. 's obligations. But for
Bokides' failure to notify Agricredit of Roberta's withdrawal as guarantor, McCormick would not
have obtained a judgment against Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42, together with interest
from the date of the judgment. As a result of Bokides' negligence in notifying Agricredit of
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Roberta's withdrawal as guarantor, Bokides is required to indemnify and hold harmless Roberta
from the judgment against her by McCormick, together with all costs and expenses in the
underlying action incurred by McCormick.
2.

In violation of the Court's Scheduling Order dated April 9, 2010, Bokides filed, on

the day of trial. a Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15, to amend his answer to assert the affirmative
defense of failure to mitigate. The assertion of failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative
defense which, under I.R.C.P. 8(c), a party must set forth in his or her pleading in response to
the other·s party pleading. See Taylor v. Browning. 129 Idaho 483, 927 P.2d 873 (1996). In

Taylor v. Brmvning the party seeking to amend its pleading did so by way of a motion to have the
pleadings conform to the evidence relating to mitigation which was not objected to at trial. In this
case. Roberta specifically did not waive her objection to allowing the pleadings to be amended,
which is a different situation than that in Taylor v. Browning. Roberta has consistently maintained
her position that mitigation in this case is not a factual issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that she
impliedly consented to allowing proof to be presented on this issue. As such, the Court must deny
Bokides' Motion to amend his answer to assert a claim for failure to mitigate.
3.

In the alternative, in the event that the Court allows Bokides to amend his answer

and assert the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages, Roberta requests the following
conclusion of law: any claim Roberta would have against William would be based upon contract
while her claim against Bokides stems from negligence. Bokides has suggested that Roberta must
pursue William before she can bring an action against him.

While the reasonableness of one· s

actions is at issue on a claim of failure to mitigate, one cannot be required as a matter of law to
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bring a separate lawsuit against a separate party.

This is not a situation of a compulsory

counterclaim or joint tortfeasor: there is no compulsory requirement to be found in Idaho law.

If this were the case then the contrary argument would also be applicable. William could argue
that Roberta could not pursue him until she ·'mitigates'' her damages and first pursues Bokides.
The road that Bokides is asking the Court to go down is endless and could lead to second guessing
any plaintiffs decisions to sue or not sue multiple potential defendants and plaintiff's decisions to
settle when there are multiple potential defendants.
The other problem with Bokides' suggestion is that it puts the trier of fact in a position of
second guessing her decision as to the merits of any cause of action she may have against William
and whether William is judgment proof. In this case, the Divorce Decree provides that William
will indemnify Roberta for ·· All indebtedness related to the closely held corporation Bear River
Farm Equipment, Inc .. including. but not limited to, any claims or litigation arising out of the
business operated by Bear River Farm Equipment. Inc."

Roberta was sued by McCormick on

her personal guaranty and the undisputed evidence is that the indemnity provision in the Divorce
Decree only applies to business indebtedness and not indebtedness under a personal guaranty.
Because there are contested factual and legal issues relating to William's obligations to indemnify
Roberta. it is inappropriate for the trier of fact to attempt to resolve those issues under the guise
of an affirmative defense for failure to mitigate.

It is inappropriate for this case to turn from a

negligence/malpractice action into an indictment of Roberta's decisions regarding her ability to
fund a separate lawsuit against William, and her conclusions as to William's assets. liabilities and
financial capability of paying a judgment. In fact. when Bokides himself was asked why he did
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not pursue William. he testified that it was discussed with his counsel but that he did not have a
reason for not doing so. Bokides himself could have just as easily brought an action against
William under a third party or other type of claim and he chose not to do so. The bottom line is
that as a matter of law, the trier of fact should not be asked to resolved the merits of Roberta's
claims against William, second guess the decisions of Roberta, and second guess the costs and
benefits of attempting to collect a judgment against William.
4.

Finally. in the alternative if the Court is inclined to view the evidence as to

mitigation of damages. Roberta requests the following conclusion of law: Mitigation of damages
is defined by IDJI2d 9.14 as follows: ''Any person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary
care to minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to
exercise such care cannot be recovered." Idaho courts have consistently held that the burden of
proof lies with the party asserting the affirmative defense. More specifically, the burden of proof
as to mitigation of damages is on the party causing the alleged damages, Bokides in this instance.
See Davis v. First Interstate Bank, 115 Idaho 169. 765 P.2d 680 (1988); Eliopulos v. Kondo
Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,643 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1982). Thus. the burden is on Bokides to
prove that Roberta did not exercise reasonable care to mitigate her damages.
5.

Bokides has not met his burden of proving that Roberta

reasonable care to mitigate her damages.

failed to exercise

While Bokides would like to disregard his own

obligations and his own right to pursue William, his ··Monday Morning Quarterbacking" does
not meet his burden. First, there is a reasonable question as to whether Roberta has a valid claim
against William based upon the Divorce Decree failing to clearly require indemnification for
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claims based on her personal guarantee. It was reasonable for Roberta to conclude that such an
action was not guaranteed and may ultimately only cost her more money.

Second, it was

reasonable for Roberta to question whether, even if she was successful in obtaining a judgment
against William, she would be able to collect on said judgment.

Roberta was aware of the

financial condition of William, aware of his negative net worth and the pending lawsuits and
judgments against William. It was not unreasonable for Roberta to decide not to incur additional
expenses and legal costs to pursue William based upon her personal knowledge of his financial
condition.
6.

Based upon the evidence presented at trial and applying the applicable law, the

Court concludes that Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore is entitled to Judgment against ThirdParty Defendant in the sum of $342.417.42. together with interest thereon at the legal rate until
paid in full, together with any sums due McCormick pursuant to the Judgment in the underlying
case. The Court further concludes that Roberta Shore is the prevailing party.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2010.
RINGERT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV 08-327

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants.

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Client: 1763521.1

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant,

COMES NOW the third-party defendant, Nicholas Bokides, by and through
undersigned counsel, and hereby submits Third-Party Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
I.

1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

William R. Shore ("Bill") married Roberta Shore ("Roberta") in 1991.

Both Bill and Roberta had been married on previous occasions. Bill and Roberta had no children
during their marriage.
2.

Bill and Roberta acquired Bear River Equipment, Inc. ("Bear River")

during the course of their marriage. Bear River sold farm equipment and machinery, including
machinery and products manufactured by McCormick International USA, Inc. ("McCormick").
3.

In order to finance its inventory from McCormick, Bear River entered into

agreements with Agri-Credit which were executed by Bill and Roberta on behalf of Bear River.
4.

On March 22, 2005, Bill and Roberta executed personal guarantees

wherein they unconditionally guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear River to Agri-Credit.
5.

The guarantee signed by Bill and Roberta contained a provision, which

stated in pertinent part:
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And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC
shall have received at its Head Office, written notice from the
guarantor or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of
the Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this
guarantee.
6.

In or about July or August 2007, an audit performed by McCormick and

Agri-Credit revealed that Bear River had been selling equipment financed through Agri-Credit,
receiving proceeds from the sales, but failing to apply said proceeds to Agri-Credit as required
by the agreements with Agri-Credit.
7.

On August 29, 2008, McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as

Bill and Roberta Shore in their individual capacities. The complaint alleged that Bear River
failed to pay McCormick the sum of $273,080.60 in principal, together with accruing
prejudgment interest at the legal rate. See McCormick v. Bear River, Complaint,~ 14.
8.

McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20, 2010. This motion

was granted on June 10, 2010, and thereafter, judgment was entered against Bear River, Bill and
Roberta Shore on June 29, 2010, for the sum of $319,977.98. Thereafter, an amended judgment
was entered which included attorney fees that had been incurred, on August 12, 2010, for the
total amount of $342,417.42.
9.

The initial judgment related to five tractors and three loaders. The

proceeds from the sale of the equipment were not paid to Agri-Credit as required by the
agreements between Bear River and Agri-Credit. Among the items included, was a tractor,
model number NCl 15, which was financed on October 23, 2006.
10.

All of the remaining items of equipment were financed on or after

December 21, 2006.
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11.

In or about March 2006, Bill and Roberta decided to terminate their

mamage. Roberta retained Nicholas Bokides ("Bokides") to represent her interest in the divorce
proceeding.
12.

As part of the divorce, Roberta wanted to completely extricate herself

from any involvement with Bear River. To accomplish this, Roberta and Bill agreed that all
ownership of the company would be given to Bill, and Bill would be responsible for any and all
liabilities from the company.
13.

Roberta asked Bokides to remove her from the guarantees. Roberta and

Bokides did not discuss a specific date or timeline as to when written notice terminating the
guarantees would be sent to Agri-Credit.
14.

Bokides advised Roberta that all debts incurred up to the time of the

divorce decree were community debts and that until the decree was entered, he would not take
any action to cancel her guarantees.
15.

The divorce decree was entered into on November 16, 2006. Bokides did

not send written notice terminating the guarantees following entry of the decree.
16.

Under Paragraph IV of the decree, the parties agreed that Bill would retain

possession of a ranch/farm property located in Adams County, Council, Idaho (hereinafter, the
"Council Ranch"). Under the decree, Bill was to market the property without the assistance of a
realtor up until March 31, 2007. Upon the sale of the property, Roberta would receive
$1,300,000 out of the net proceeds, with the balance of the proceeds to go to Bill.
17.

In the event that Bill failed to sell the property by March 31, 2007, Bill

was required to list the property with a realtor, and "actively market the property in good faith."
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18.

Bill was to pay Roberta the sum of $1,000 per month beginning

March 1, 2007, and continue until the property was sold and Roberta received the $1,300,000 out
of the net proceeds. In the event the property was not sold before March 1, 2009, the plaintiff
was to be paid 5% annual interest on the $1,300,000.
19.

Under Paragraph VI of the decree, Bill agreed to defend and hold Roberta

harmless from the following indebtedness:
All indebtedness relating to operation of the farm property.
All indebtedness incurred by defendant.
All indebtedness related to the closely held corporation Bear River
Farm Equipment, Inc., including, but not limited to, any claims or
litigation against the parties arising out of the business operated by
Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc. including attorney fees and
costs.
20.

After McCormick filed the complaint in August 2008, Roberta discussed

the complaint with Bill and they both agreed that Bill was responsible for the claims in the
McCormick complaint under the terms of the decree.
21.

In addition to the decree, Bill and Roberta entered into a second agreement

in January 2007, relating to a lawsuit filed by Rodney Peterson for conversion of certain farm
equipment, filed in the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of Franklin, State ofldaho.
Under Paragraph 7 of the agreement to indemnify, Bill had the right to retain counsel for Roberta
and control the defense of the claims.
22.

In or about August 2008, McCormick sent a demand letter to Roberta

relative to the guarantee she had signed with Agri-Credit. This is the first time Roberta learned
that Bokides had failed to send written notice terminating her from the Agri-Credit guarantees.
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23.

Bill had retained James G. Reid, of Ringert Law, Chartered, to represent

him in several matters arising from the problems with Bear River. Bill also retained Mr. Reid
and his firm to represent him in the McCormick case. Bill and Roberta agreed that Mr. Reid
would also represent Roberta in the McCormick case.
24.

Roberta believed that Bill would resolve and settle the case with

McCormick at the time it was filed. Roberta discussed the fact that Mr. Reid would be
representing her. They both assumed that Bill would settle the claims with McCormick and
therefore, it would be appropriate for Mr. Reid to represent them both, in order to minimize any
expenses that Roberta would incur.
25.

At some point during the litigation, McCormick offered to settle its claims

with Bill for $200,000. Bill had offered $100,000, but this amount was rejected by McCormick.
26.

Thereafter, it became apparent to Roberta and Bokides, that Bill was not

going to settle the claims with McCormick. At that point, Bokides advised Roberta that she
needed to retain separate counsel, and put pressure on Bill to settle with McCormick. Bokides
recommended that Roberta speak with Stan Welsh in Boise, Idaho, because he was a recognized
and aggressive attorney in the divorce field.
27.

Even though Roberta was aware that Bokides had failed to send written

notice terminating the guarantees, she did not want to file a lawsuit against Bokides, because she
recognized the claims were Bill's responsibility. Eventually, Roberta's attorney advised her that
in order to protect her interests, she would need to file a lawsuit against Bokides, even though
that was the last thing that she wanted to do. She followed her attorney's advise, and filed the
third-party complaint against Bokides in July 2009.
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28.

Roberta paid Mr. Reid's firm approximately $15,000 in attorney fees as of

January 2010, in connection with the McCormick case. Roberta did not ask or demand that Bill
pay the attorney fees, even though he was obligated to do so under the express terms of the
decree.
29.

Roberta did not tender the defense of the McCormick case to Bill.

Roberta did not demand that Bill defend, indemnify and hold her harmless from the claims in the
McCormick case.
30.

Roberta did not file a cross-claim against Bill, in an effort to seek a

judgment declaring that he was responsible for the McCormick claims under the decree, in the
event that McCormick succeeded in obtaining a judgment against her. Roberta did not submit
any written discovery to Bill, or take any depositions of Bill or anyone who might have
knowledge of the nature and extent of Bill's assets and net worth.
31.

Roberta did not pursue her rights under the decree, in an effort to bring

pressure on Bill to market the property in good faith, but instead allowed him to continue to
market the property for $6.2 million up until November or December 2009.
32.

In March 2008, Bill and Roberta agreed to amend the decree, by entering

an amended judgment that gave her a mortgage in the property for $1.3 million dollars. At the
same time, Bill and Roberta agreed to remove any requirement that Bill actively market the
property in good faith, thereby giving Bill the right to retain the property and control if and when
he would sell it, and also to determine the price.
33.

Roberta did not attempt to foreclose on her mortgage at any time after

McCormick filed its complaint. If Roberta had foreclosed, she would have been able to satisfy
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her mortgage for $1.3 million, and pay McCormick's claims, assuming the property could have
been sold for a minimum of $1.6 million in August 2008.
34.

At the time of the divorce in November 2006, Roberta and Bill had a

combined net worth of $5,021,563, as reflected by the property schedule prepared by Bokides
during the divorce. Of that amount, Bill received $2,991,139 worth of property and assets from
the divorce, and Roberta received $2,284,000, including the $1.3 million dollars proceeds from
the sale of the Council Ranch.
35.

The $5 million dollar figure was based upon an assumed value for the

Council Ranch of $3,165,000, as reflected in the Broker's Opinion prepared by Creed Noah,
dated September 21, 2006.
36.

Creed Noah assigned a value of $372,000 to the "unfinished custom

home" on the Council Ranch, and stated that that value was based on the home's "current
unfinished condition," and that there was a "great deal more expense required to complete this
building in conformance with the current plan."
37.

After November 2006, and prior to the time of trial, Bill spent over

$100,000 on improvements to the home. Roberta did not retain any experts to appraise the value
of the Council Ranch as of August 2008, or at any time up to and including the trial.
38.

Sometime in 2007, Bill received an offer on the property for $5 million

dollars however, upon further investigation, the offer turned out to be a sham.
39.

In February 2010, Bill prepared a financial statement, in response to

discovery requests propounded by Bokides. As of February 2010, Bill estimated that his net
worth, after subtracting all current liabilities from his total assets, was $230,920. Bill's net worth
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in February 2010, would have been sufficient to pay the $200,000 that McCormick had offered
to settle for.
40.

In February 2010, Bill claimed that the value of the Council Ranch had

declined from $3.16 million to $1,625,000. Bill testified that the value of the property had
declined significantly since the divorce. Bill did not offer an opinion as to the fair market value
of the property as of August 2008, when McCormick filed its complaint, but both Bill and
Roberta agreed the property was worth much more in August 2008, than in February 2010, a fact
that was borne out by Bill's continuing efforts to market the property for $6.2 million.
41.

Bill testified at trial that the fair market value of the property as of the time

of trial, was approximately $900,000, based on an offer for that amount he had received within
the last month.
42.

Both Bill and Roberta were aware that the amount of damages

McCormick was seeking in the complaint filed in August 2008, was accruing interest and that
therefore, their potential liability and exposure would continue to increase over time. Similarly,
both Bill and Roberta were cognizant of the fact that the value of the Council Ranch property
was diminishing over time.
43.

Both Bill and Roberta testified that following the divorce, and the ensuing

financial problems with Bear River, Bill had exhausted a significant portion of his assets paying
claims and judgments filed against Bear River.
44.

In addition to the Council Ranch, Bill also owned real property in Preston,

Idaho, upon which Bear River's facility was located. Bill estimated the fair market value of this
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property as $220,000 in February 2010. In the property schedules prepared by Bokides in
connection with the divorce, the Preston real estate was valued at $300,000.
45.

On his financial statement in February 2010, Bill lists his machinery and

equipment values at $142,000. At the time of the divorce, the machinery and equipment were
listed at $160,000 with Roberta's comments being, that an "appraisal was needed," because over
$160,000 had been invested in the equipment by Bill and Roberta.
46.

With respect to the liabilities listed on the February 2010 financial

statement, he lists that he was personally liable for payroll taxes to the IRS in the amount of
$272,000. Bill testified at trial that he assumed, that he was personally liable for this entire
amount.
47.

The May 17, 2010 letter from the IRS to Bill denying his appeal states that

Bill is only personally liable for $94,669 in trust fund taxes. This figure is supported by two (2)
separate forms, Form 2751, which assert liabilities of $64,364.74 and $30,303.41. These
documents were attached to the May 17, 2010 letter.
48.

The December 12, 2007 letter from the IRS that is addressed to Bear River

sets forth the outstanding balance for payroll taxes in the amount of $176,888.57, which is the
amount assessed against the corporation, not against Bill. Under the Trust Fund Recovery Act,
Bill is only personally liable for the $94,669 and accordingly, Bill had overstated his liability by
$176,888.57.
49.

By adding the $177,000 to his admitted net worth of $230,000 in the

February 2010 financial statement, Bill had $400,000 in net worth, which would have been more
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than enough to satisfy the entire amount of the amended McCormick judgment, and would have
been more than enough to pay the $200,000, that McCormick was willing to settle its claims for.
50.

In his financial statement of February 2010, Bill also lists a liability in the

amount of $20,900 for Idaho payroll taxes. Although Bill may be liable pursuant to
LC. §63-378, the August 25, 2007 notice of deficiency shows an assessment of $12,209.07, not
the $20,900 as reported by Bill on his financial statement. Again, Bill has overstated this
liability by $8,690.93.
51.

Bill also lists on his is financial statement a liability in the form of a claim

for attorney fees by the law firm Merrill and Merrill, in the amount of $69,700. This amount was
incurred by the firm in representing Bill in one of his lawsuits with Mr. Peterson. There is no
evidence that Merrill and Merrill has made any active attempts to collect on this amount, other
than sending Bill monthly invoices. Bill does not believe this is a valid debt, or at a minimum,
that he has defenses to this potential debt based upon incompetence of representation.
52.

In addition, Bill lists as a liability a loan to his aunt, Elminor Harper for

$62,500 which he borrowed on order to pay one of his claims. Bill's aunt is in her 90's and has
made no active attempts to execute on the judgment or accelerate the debt. Bill is voluntarily
paying his aunt $500 a month.

II.
1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Roberta and Bokides agreed that Bokides would notify Agri-Credit in

writing to remove Roberta from the guarantees. No specific timeframe was discussed or agreed
upon as to when the notices would be sent. Bokdies felt there were prudent reasons not to send
the notices before the divorce was final and explained bis reasons to Roberta.
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2.

Bokides did not send written notice to Agri-Credit following the divorce

in November 2006. Even if he would have, Roberta would still be liable for the equipment
provided to Bear River in October 2006.
3.

Because of Bokdies' failure to send written notice, Roberta has a potential

liability to McCormick for the amount in the amended judgment, in the event that McCormick
does not execute on its judgment and satisfy its claim's against Bill. Alternatively, Roberta has a
potential liability to McCormick, if McCormick is only successful in satisfying part of its
judgment by executing on Bill's assets.
4.

Bill has an obligation to defend, indemnify and hold Roberta harmless

from any and all debts arising from the operation of Bear River under the express terms of the
decree. The claims in the McCormick complaint that gave rise to that amended judgment, arise
from the operation of Bear River and accordingly, Bill has a legal duty to indemnify Roberta
from the claims in the complaint.
5.

Roberta possesses a valid legal claim against Bill for indemnification

under the terms of the decree. The fact that Roberta has not elected to file a claim, does not
mean that she does not possess the claim.
6.

Roberta has an obligation to take reasonable steps to mitigate her actual or

potential damages she may suffer that stern from Bokides failure to send written notices to
Agri-Credit. Once Roberta became aware of any actual or potential damages, she was under a
legal obligation to take prompt and reasonable steps to mitigate her potential damages. The law
does not permit Roberta to merely sit back and passively allow herself to be subjected to losses.
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7.

Roberta had a duty to take reasonable steps to either eliminate or, at a

minimum, take steps to reduce the damages she might suffer. The fact that Bill may not have
liquid assets or cash available to satisfy the entire amount of the McCormick judgment, is not the
issue. The question is whether Bill had any assets available to satisfy all, or even part of the
judgment.
8.

Roberta's obligation to mitigate damages arose when she became aware of

Bokides negligence. Roberta first became aware of Bokides negligence when McCormick sent
its demand letter to her and in any event, no later than August 2008, when McCormick filed its
complaint. Therefore, if Bill had any assets to either pay in its entirety, or satisfy a part of the
claims, Roberta was required to go after those assets.
9.

James Reid and his firm represented Bill in the McCormick case.

Mr. Reid owed fiduciary obligations of competence, loyalty and confidentiality to Bill.
Simultaneously, Mr. Reid represented Roberta in the same litigation. Mr. Reid and his firm
owed the same fiduciary obligations of competence, loyalty and confidentiality to Roberta.
10.

Given Bill's unequivocal duty to defend and indemnify Roberta as

contained in the decree, Bill's financial interest was inconsistent with Roberta's interest. Given
Roberta's duty to seek indemnification, her interests were clearly at loggerheads with Bill.
11.

Even though Roberta had an unequivocal duty to mitigate her damages

and seek recovery against Bill, Mr. Reid could not pursue any claims against Bill because, under
Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Subparagraph (b)(3), a lawyer cannot agree
to represent a client if the representation involves "the assertion of a claim by one client against
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another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal." Such a conflict cannot be waived; it is a non-consentable conflict.
12.

Mr. Reid was therefore precluded from asserting any claims against Bill

on behalf of Roberta in the McCormick case. As a matter oflaw, Roberta could not discharge
her duty to mitigate her damages by retaining the same lawyer that represented Bill and as a
consequence, her claims against Bokides must be dismissed.
13.

Since Roberta has not suffered any actual damages from the McCormick

case at this point in time, and McCormick could still execute and satisfy its entire judgment
against Bill, Roberta may never suffer any damages. Moreover, the statute oflimitations on
Roberta's claim for indemnification against Bill has not even began to run. Therefore, if
McCormick does not satisfy its judgment against Bill, Roberta can retain independent counsel,
and bring her claims against Bill.
14.

Roberta's claim that it would have been futile to pursue any claims against

Bill because he was broke, is invalid, as a matter oflaw. The law does not require that a party
have liquid assets available to pay a judgment, only that he has some assets available. Moreover,
the law does not require that a party have enough assets to satisfy the entire judgment; it is
sufficient if that party has some assets available to reduce the amount of damages.
15.

The law does not allow the party to merely sit back and allow damages to

accrue. The law requires a party to take reasonable steps, which includes the obligation to
expend reasonable amounts of money and attorney fees, in pursuing a claim against another
party. That is especially true in cases such as the instant case, where another party is primarily
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obligated to satisfy the debt, as Bill was primarily obligated under the decree, and Roberta was
only secondarily liable, by virtue ofBokides failure to send written notices to Agri-Credit.
16.

Roberta could have taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages in

August 2008, and Bill had sufficient assets in August 2008, to pay the entire amount of the
McCormick claim, of $275,000.
17.

Even as late as February 2010, Bill estimated his net worth to be

$230,000. By 2010, Bill estimates that the fair market value of the Council Ranch had
diminished significantly. Although the property may have declined in value between
November 2006 and August 2008, to some extent Bill continued to market the property for $6.2
million. If in fact the property was not worth $6 million, or even close thereto, then Bill was not
actively marketing the property in good faith, as was his obligation under the express terms of
the decree.
18.

Roberta could have pursued her right to enforce the terms of the decree

when Bill failed to actively market the Council Property, by bringing suit and accelerating her
debt. Thereafter, in March 2008, when Roberta obtained a mortgage on the property, she could
have foreclosed on her mortgage and satisfied her claims for $1.3 million, and the McCormick
judgment, if the property would have sold for even $1.6 million. In August 2008, the property
was worth that amount, since even Bill admits the property was worth $1.6 million in
February 2010, almost two (2) years later.
19.

Bill was able to pay virtually all of his claims and creditors with the

exception of McCormick, and exhausted numerous assets in the effort, between November 2006
and February 2010. Nevertheless, Bill still had $230,000 of net worth in February 2010.
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Moreover, given Bill's mistaken assumptions about his personal liability to the IRS, Bill actually
had a net worth closer to $400,000 in February 2010, which amount would have been sufficient
to satisfy the entire amount claimed by McCormick in its complaint, and/or the amount in the
amended judgment.
20.

In addition, there are a number of other items in Bill's financial statement

in February 2010, in which his liabilities were overstated, such as the claims to Merrill and
Merrill and his aunt. Moreover, Roberta believed that at the time McCormick filed its complaint,
that Bill had sufficient assets to settle the claims with McCormick, which is why she refrained
from bringing any suit against Bokides.
21.

Both Bill and Roberta recognized that McCormick's claims continued to

increase in value over time because of interest and attorney fees, and at the same time Bill was
spending his assets paying other claims, and the value of the real property was diminishing. As
such, Roberta understood that her potential damages would actually increase over time. If
Roberta had acted promptly in an attempt to mitigate, her potential damages would have been
much less in August 2008 then they are in August 2010.
22.

Roberta did not take any steps to mitigate her damages against Bill which

included, among other things, hiring independent counsel to represent and defend her; tendering
the defense of claims to Bill; filing a cross-claim against Bill; and seeking to enforce the terms of
the decree by either accelerating the debt, or later by foreclosing on her mortgage. Because
Roberta has taken no steps to minimize her damages, and because she was legally precluded
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages because her attorney represented Bill, as a matter
of law, her claims must be dismissed.
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DATED this 13th day of September, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

&

6/W~

Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of September, 2010, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
Laura E. Burri

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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( ) Overnight Mail
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Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF FRANKLIN

McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-327

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S
CLOSING ARGUMENT

vs.
BEAR RNER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual.
Defendants.
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ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

vs.
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
While Nick Bokides ("Bokides") admits that he did not provide written notice to
McCormick and AgriCredit as requested by his client Roberta Shore ("Roberta"), there is a
dispute as to when the parties agreed Bokides would give notice to these creditors.
More importantly, Bokides' negligence does not eliminate Roberta's duty to
mitigate but, in fact, it was Bokides' negligence which created the duty to mitigate. The
evidence presented shows that Roberta took no steps to mitigate her damages. She relied on
Bill Shore's ("Bill") attorney to represent her and evaluate her claims against Bill. Within the
context of that representation, Bill and Roberta's attorney determined that pursuing Bill would be
fruitless. While Roberta has argued that Bill has no assets, a review of Bill's unsubstantiated
financial statement shows, that by his own account, he has a positive net worth. A net worth that
could be used to satisfy McCormick's judgment in whole, or at least in part. Roberta has not
satisfied her duty to mitigate and her claims against Bokides should therefore be barred.
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DISCUSSION

I.

ROBERTA SHORE HAS FAILED TO MITIGATE HER DAMAGES AND
THEREFORE, HER CLAIMS AGAINST BOKIDES MUST BE DENIED
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT SHE COULD
HAVE RECOVERED BY SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FROM
WILLIAM SHORE.
It is universally recognized by courts and commentators that a party who has been

injured by the conduct of another, whether in contract or in tort, has an obligation to take
reasonable steps to mitigate his/her damages. The duty to mitigate, also known as the doctrine of
avoidable consequences, "provides that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a
defendant is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by
reasonable acts .... " 1 The policy underlying the doctrine of avoidable consequences is to
prevent "persons against whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic
loss which could be avoided by reasonable efforts." 2
Idaho courts have also specifically held that the doctrine of mitigation of damages
is applicable to a legal malpractice claim. Thus, in the case of O'Neil v. Vasseur3, the Idaho
Supreme Court stated that "if an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the
client with an alternative remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result
maybe that the client suffers no loss or a reduced loss as the proximate cause of the attorney's
negligent conduct." 4

1

U.S. Bank National Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222,228, 999 P.2d 877, 883 (2000).

2

Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574,577,532 P.2d 918,919 (1974)
quoting Wright v. Baumann, 398 P.2d 119 (1965).
3

118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134.

4

118 at 262, quoting Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2nd 654, 658 (ND 1999).(emphasis

added).
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In this case, Roberta Shore could have recovered and still can recover against
Bill's assets. He is primarily responsible for satisfaction of the judgment under the Divorce
Decree, notwithstanding Bokides' alleged negligence. Roberta has done exactly what the policy
underlying the doctrine of avoidable consequences seeks to prevent. Upon the advice of counsel
for both Bill and her, Roberta has passively stood by, rather than pursuing claims against Bill.
Since the commencement of this litigation, rather than take any action against Bill, Roberta has
watched Bill's net worth decrease and his ability to satisfy the claims diminish.
The case at bar exemplifies the very evils that the doctrine of mitigation was
designed to prevent, i.e. where a party injured by the conduct of another sits back and passively
allows damages to be incurred, without taking any steps to eliminate or reduce those damages.
Roberta has taken absolutely no steps whatsoever, much less any reasonable steps, to attempt to
force her former husband, Bill, to satisfy part or all of McCormick's claims and judgment.
Roberta has not met her burden to mitigate her damages.
A.

By failing to retain independent counsel, Roberta Shore was prohibited
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages, because of a nonconsentable conflict of interest.
As has previously been submitted to the Court, the Decree of Divorce between

Bill and Roberta provides that Bill was obligated to indemnify, defend and hold
Roberta harmless for any and all indebtedness related to Bear River Equipment. While Bill is
contractually and legally obligated to defend and indemnify Roberta from those very claims,
Roberta now argues that that it is not certain that she could bring a claim against Bill. This
argument is refuted by Bill's own acknowledgement that he is responsible for the McCormick
and AgriCredit liabilities pursuant to the Divorce Decree and further exemplifies the conflict of
the same attorney representing both Roberta and Bill.
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Upon the filing of the complaint by McCormick against Bill and Roberta in
August of 2008, Roberta should and could have tendered the defense of the case to her exhusband, Bill. Bill would have been required, under the express language of the Divorce Decree,
to both defend and indemnify Roberta, by paying any costs and legal fees that would have been
incurred. If Bill would have rejected the tender of defense, then Roberta should and could have
filed a cross-claim at that point in time, seeking to enforce the indemnification provision of the
decree in the lawsuit brought by McCormick.
Rather than making any effort or attempt to force Bill to indemnify and defend
her, Roberta did the one thing that effectively precluded her from insisting that Bill indemnify
and defend her; she retained the same law firm that was representing Bill! More importantly, by
failing to retain independent counsel, Roberta was precluded from making any attempt to
mitigate her damages. In particular, Rule 1. 7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, which
governs conflicts of interest, provides in relevant part under sub-section "b" as follows:
(b)
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under Paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal; ....
Under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Roberta's law firm could not
assert a claim against Bill and continue to represent her. Nor could they reasonably evaluate the
merits of taking such an action against Bill. Such representation would have constituted a nonconsentable conflict. After consulting with Bill's attorney, Roberta determined that rather than
asserting a claim against Bill and take reasonable steps to mitigate her damages, she should file a
third-party complaint against her attorney, Nicholas Bokides, alleging that he should be held
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exclusively responsible for the entire amount of McCormick's judgment against Bill and
Roberta, because of his failure to submit written notices to McCormick that Roberta would no
longer be liable on the continuing guarantees.
It is axiomatic that Roberta's law firm had a duty to zealously represent and

defend her. Likewise, that firm had the same obligation to vigorously represent and defend Bill.
Roberta's law firm could not take any steps to seek to enforce the indemnification provisions of
the divorce decree against Bill, while at the same time representing Bill. Therefore, Roberta has
focused all of her efforts and resources on shifting responsibility for Bill's debts to McCormick
on to Bokides, who, is at best, only secondarily liable for damages to Roberta. This is precisely
the type of conflict that the rules were designed to prevent.
Bill has a clear, unequivocal obligation to both defend and indemnify Roberta
from any and all indebtedness from Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc., and has clearly admitted
this obligation in this case. Given the indemnification provision in the Divorce Decree,
Roberta's interests are unquestionably aligned directly against Bill. Unfortunately, because
Roberta and Bill are represented by the same law firm, there has been not even the slightest
effort to "vigorously develop" the claims against Bill.
Given the patently obvious conflict of interest, Roberta was precluded from taking
any steps to mitigate her damages and accordingly, as a matter oflaw, the Court should dismiss
Roberta's claims against Bokides.
B.

Roberta Shore has taken no steps to mitigate her damages, much less any
reasonable steps.

In virtually every case that can be found, in Idaho or anywhere else, the courts
have stated that a party who has been injured by the actionable conduct of another, must take
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"reasonable steps" or make "reasonable efforts" or "actions" in order to mitigate his/her
damages. In this case, Roberta has not taken any steps whatsoever to mitigate her damages,
much less any reasonable ones. Under such circumstances, the Court should rule as a matter of
law, that Roberta has failed to mitigate her damages and dismiss her claims against Bokides.
When McCormick filed its complaint against Bear River Equipment, Bill and
Roberta, the reasonable steps that Roberta should and could have taken include the following:
1.

Hire independent counsel to represent and defend her in the case;

2.

Tender the defense of the claims to Bill, thereby forcing Bill to retain

separate counsel;
3.

File a cross-claim against Bill;

4.

Sue to enforce the terms of the Divorce Decree, which required Bill to

defend and indemnify Roberta;
5.

Sue to enforce the terms of the divorce decree, which required Bill to

make good faith efforts to sell the property to satisfy his debts;
6.

Propound written discovery to Bill to discover the current state of his

7.

Take depositions of persons with knowledge of Bill's assets;

8.

Send subpoenas to all institutions or banks that may have knowledge of

assets;

Bill's wealth or assets;
9.

Conduct an asset search to determine assets he may have or may be

10.

Conduct a title search for any and all real property owned by Bill;

concealing;
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11.

Retain an expert to appraise the current value of the property owned by

Bill as of the time McCormick filed its complaint; and
12.

File a brief or affidavits in opposition to the summary judgment motion

filed by McCormick, rather than merely passively allowing judgment to be taken and thereafter
trying to force Bokides to pay that judgment.
Because Roberta did not take any steps to mitigate her damages, she clearly has
not taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages and therefore, her claims should be
dismissed.
C.

Roberta Shore is not relieved from her obligation to mitigate damages
because of her claim that it might have been futile to make such efforts.

Roberta's excuse for failing to mitigate is that it would have been "futile" to make
a claim against William Shore, because he allegedly does not have the financial ability to retire
the debt. If Roberta contends that Bill has no assets whatsoever, or, conversely, whether she
contends that Bill does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the entire amount of McCormick's
judgment for approximately $340,000, then her contention is not consistent with the evidence
presented, as Bill has admitted he has sufficient assets to satisfy at least a portion of the
judgment.
On the other hand, if Roberta's claim is that Bill does not have sufficient assets to
satisfy the judgment in its entirety, and therefore she has no duty to mitigate, her argument is
contrary to all of the cases and opinions which state a party has a duty to mitigate damages, even
if the efforts are only successful in reducing the amount of the damages incurred, as opposed to
eliminating the damages in their entirety.
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Accordingly, "mitigation" is not generally an affirmative theory ofrecovery. It is
a vehicle employed by the defendants to show a plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to
minimize its damages. If the defendant is successful, the court can reduce or even deny the
damages asserted by the plaintiff . ..

5

Bokides recognizes that under Idaho law, he has the burden of proving that Robert
failed to reasonably mitigate her damages. However, once the party asserting the affirmative
defense has shown that available alternatives existed to the other party which would have
minimized the damages, the burden shifts back to the other party to prove that there were no
other reasonable alternatives. Bokides has demonstrated that there were and are other alternative
sources that from which Roberta could have reduced or even eliminated her damages, i.e. by
filing a claim against Bill. The burden then shifted to Roberta to prove that this was not a
reasonable alternative source. Roberta failed to establish that Bill does not have, at a minimum,
the ability to satisfy part of the judgment.
Despite Roberta's self-serving claim that it would have been futile to sue her exhusband because he was broke, does not relieve her from the obligation of bringing suit, and
attempting to pursue her claims of indemnification against him. As the Supreme Court has stated
"the doctrine [of avoidable consequences] requires reasonable effort to mitigate damages. Thus,
if reasonable, the efforts need not be successful." 6

5

In Re: JL Korn, 352 Br 228, D Idaho (2006). See also Clark v. Int 'l Harvester Co., 99
Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784, 805 (1978).
6

Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, NA, 115 Idaho 169, 171, 765 P.2d 680 (1988),
citing JP Calamari and J P. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 (2nd Ed., 1977).
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II.

IF ROBERTA SHORE HAD MADE ANY EFFORT TO MITIGATE, SHE
COULD HAVE ELlMINATED ORAT A MINIMUM, REDUCED HER
DAMAGES.
When it became apparent that Roberta did not undertake any efforts to attempt to

mitigate her damages and hold Bill responsible for McCormick's claims, Bokides undertook
efforts to conduct discovery to investigate what assets Bill had available to pay the McCormick's
claims. In connection with the discovery requests propounded by Bokides, Bill prepared a
financial statement in February 2010, demonstrating, by his own admission, a net worth of
approximately $230,000, which would have been available to at least partially satisfy
McCormick's claims. Moreover, Bokides believes the financial statement, which was prepared
for purposes oflitigation, most likely understated Bill's net worth, and over exaggerated his
liabilities, thereby skewing his real net worth. For example, Bill owns a ranch property in
Council, Idaho which, at the time of the divorce, was valued at approximately $3.6 million
dollars. Additionally, Bill failed to include a lot he owns in Council, Idaho. Bill also
significantly overstated his liabilities to the IRS and State Tax Commission.
Roberta testified that Bill was attempting to sell the property in 2007 for
approximately $6.5 million. If the sale price was even remotely close to the fair market value of
the property, that value would have been more than adequate to satisfy all of the McCormick's
claims, and also pay Roberta's lien on the property in the amount of$1.3 million.
Moreover, McCormick filed the initial lawsuit in August 2008, and therefore, the
relevant timeframe for determining whether Bill had any assets was in August 2008, and not two
(2) years later in August 2010, at the time of the trial. If the property has declined in value in the
last two (2) years then, then the decline further exemplifies Bokides argument that Roberta has
not taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages, by filing a timely cross-claim against Bill
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On the other hand, if Bill was deliberately increasing the price of the property
well above fair market value, then it is clear that he would not have been acting in good faith in
an attempt to market the property, as was his obligation under the Divorce Decree.

III.

ROBERTA SHORE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES
AGAINST BOKIDES FROM THE MCCORMICK JUDGMENT,
BECAUSE MCCORMICK HAS NOT, AND MAY NEVER ENFORCE THE
JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERTA SHORE.
As stated in previous briefing by Bokides in support of its motion for summary

judgment, the law in Idaho makes clear that a party cannot recover damages in a malpractice
action where there is only a potential for damages. Chicione v. Bignal, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d
1293 (1992). At the time Bokdies filed his motion for summary judgment, McCormick had not
obtained its judgment. McCormick has since obtained a judgment in June 2010, which judgment
is entered in favor of McCormick, and against Bear River Equipment, Bill and Roberta. It is
undisputed that Roberta and Bill are jointly and severally liable on the continuing guarantees to
McCormick.
McCormick has the option of pursuing its judgment against either Bill, Roberta,
or both, to the extent one or the other has insufficient funds to satisfy the entire judgment. If
McCormick elects to proceed against Bill, and records its judgment against the property owned
by Bill, which it may, it would be able foreclose on its claims and sell the property, and receive
full reimbursement for its judgment. If McCormick pursues this option, Roberta will suffer no
damages.
Roberta's claim that she suffered damages by way of attorney fees incurred by
having to defend against McCormick's claims is clearly erroneous. First, if Roberta Shore would
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have tendered the defense to Bill, he would have been required to defend and indemnify her,
from any and all claims, including costs and attorney fees.
Moreover, since the undisputed evidence shows that at least one tractor was sold
to Bear River in August 2006 and Bokides was not required to send a written notice until
November 2006, McCormick would have brought suit against Roberta in any event and she
would still have been required to hire an attorney and incur those costs and fees. Roberta has
offered no evidence that McCormick would have released her from the guaranty, even ifBokides
had sent written notice.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding Bill's absolute and admitted liability, Roberta has not sought to
enforce the provisions of the Decree of Divorce against Bill, nor taken any other steps to ensure
that Bill indemnifies her, such as filing a cross-claim against him. Rather, Roberta has only
sought to pass on any potential damages she may sustain to Bokides. As demonstrated to this
Court, Roberta has a clear duty to mitigate her damages by seeking enforcement of the Decree of
Divorce against Bill.
Roberta's unwillingness to take action against Bill is an attempt to have Bokides
bear the total liability for the amounts advanced to Bear River while allowing Bill to escape
liability, and keep his ranch, pursuant to the guaranties and the Decree of Divorce. Roberta has
passively allowed the party primarily liable for the debt to avoid any responsibility by trying to
place the blame on Bokides who is, at best, secondarily liable.
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DATED this 13th day of September, 2010.
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

u~-

6J)

Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides
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COMES NOW Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter"Roberta Shore''), by and
through her attorneys of record. Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby submits this Post -Trial Reply
Brief for the court trial held on August 24, 2010.
I. INTRODUCTION

Third Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides (hereinafter "Bokides") continues to attempt to
shift the blame to Roberta Shore for the fact that Bokides admittedly failed to send written notice
terminating the guarantees even though he agreed to do so. Bok ides blames Roberta Shore for not
incurring additional legal expenses in attempting to force her ex-husband, William Shore (hereinafter
--Bill Shore"), to satisfy the McCormick judgment, even though pursuing Bill Shore would not have
been successful based upon Roberta Shore· s undisputed personal knowledge of Bill Shore's financial
status.

If Bokides really believes that Bill Shore has the financial capability to satisfy the

McCormick judgment, then why has Bokides not pursued a cross claim or other action against Bill
Shore? The obvious answer is because even though Bokides would like to second guess and play
··Monday Morning Quarterback'' with Roberta Shore's decisions, Bokides does not want to incur
additional expenses and attorney fees in pursuing Bill Shore when such efforts would likely be futile.
Bokides would rather blame the victim, who has done nothing wrong and now has a $342,417.42
judgment against her, for his negligence. The bottom line remains that Roberta Shore would not
have a judgment against her, would not have been sued on her personal guarantees and would not
be involved in this case but for Bokides' negligence.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

Undisputed Liability.

Bokides does not dispute that Roberta Shore asked Bokides to remove her from the
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guarantees and that he failed to send written notice removing her from the guarantees. Third Party
Defendant's Findings of Fact, 113. Bokides does not dispute that had he sent the letters Roberta
Shore would not be a party to this action and McCormick would not have obtained the abovereferenced Judgment against her. Further, Bokides does not dispute that Roberta Shore has paid
attorney fees in the amount of $15,000.00 "in connection with the McCormick case." Third Party
Defendant's Finding of Fact, 128. Thus, it is undisputed that Bokides was negligent and but for
his negligence Roberta Shore would not have been a party, or incurred attorney fees and expenses,
in connection with the McCormick case, would not have judgment against her.
The only dispute by Bokides relates to when Roberta Shore asked Bokides to remove her
from the personal guarantees. However, Bokides' argument that he would not take any action to
cancel the guarantees until the Divorce Decree was entered is not supported by the evidence
presented at trial. As this Court will recall, Bokides provided numerous versions of his story prior
to trial, but at trial he acknowledged that Roberta Shore asked him to send the letters prior to May
of 2006. Despite Bokides' attempt to change his story again, the undisputed testimony of Roberta
Shore was that she asked Bokides to send the letters prior to May of 2006, and Bokides not only did
not dispute said testimony but acknowledged the same. Thus, the evidence is undisputed that but
for Bokides failure to send the letters cancelling Roberta Shore's personal guarantees, Roberta Shore
would not have a judgment against her for all eight tractors and/or loaders, even the one financed on
October 23, 2006.
B.

Mitigation of Damages.

As set forth in Roberta Shore's prior briefing, the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate
was not raised in Bokides' pleadings prior to the trial and is not properly before the Court. Further,
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as a matter oflaw, this Court should not be asked to resolve the merits of Roberta Shore's potential
claim against Bill Shore, and second guess subjective determinations as to whether to proceed with
such litigation and whether collecting on any claim against Bill Shore would be futile, under the
guise of failure to mitigate. Without redundantly stating these arguments again, Roberta Shore will
simply remind the Court of the issues raised in Roberta Shore's opening briefing and point out the
fact that Bokides has failed to respond to the issues.
1.

Subjective Determinations to Pursue Bill Shore.

Bokides' entire defense in this case focuses on second guessing Roberta Shore· s decision that
pursuing her ex-husband would be futile.

As the Court is well aware, a decision by a creditor to

pursue a potential debtor is a subjective decision that involves a number of factors, including, but
not limited to:
(a)

The merits of the cause of action against the debtor. In this case it is not absolutely
clear that Roberta Shore would prevail in obtaining a judgment against Bill Shore
because she was being sued by McCormick on her personal guarantees and arguably
not on a claim "arising out of the business operated by Bear River Equipment, Inc."
Thus, the indemnification provisions referenced in paragraph VI of the Divorce
Decree may not be applicable to the suit by McCormick on Roberta Shore's personal
guarantees. In addition, Bill Shore may assert other defenses that Roberta Shore
failed to mitigate her damages by not providing written notice to McCormick
terminating the guarantees. At the very least, these are defenses that potential
creditor such as Roberta Shore may reasonably consider in determining whether to
pursue a potential debtor.
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(b)

Another potential factor a creditor may consider is the cost of pursuing a cause of
action against the judgment debtor. It is one thing for a well healed, large creditor
to disregard the risks of not prevailing on a cause of action and incur additional legal
expenses to pursue a potential debtor. It is another thing for an individual such as
Roberta Shore, who testified she did not have the financial capability to pursue Bill
Shore. to disregard the risks and spend more money pursuing a potential debtor.

(c)

As with the co st of pursuing a cause of action, a creditor must also consider the costs
of attempting to collect in the event the creditor is successful in obtaining a
judgment. There are costs associated with asset searches, execution or garnishment
of assets, debtor exams and foreclosure sales to name a few. An individual such as
Roberta Shore must make a subjective determination as to whether to incur
additional costs in attempting to collect on a judgment. In this case, Roberta Shore
testified she did not have the financial capability to pursue such collection efforts.

(d)

Finally, a creditor must make a subjective determination as to whether, even if the
creditor decides to bring a cause of action, and if that creditor is eventually successful
in obtain a judgment, whether such judgment is collectible.

In this case, it is

undisputed that Roberta Shore, as the wife of Bill Shore for fifteen years and based
upon her involvement in the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore, already had personal
knowledge of the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore and she had determined that it
would be futile.
The undisputed testimony is that Roberta Shore was aware of the subjective factors listed
above, and made the reasonable determination not to pursue Bill Shore prior to retaining Ringert

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL REPLY BRJEF - 5

Law in this action.

Roberta Shore testified that she was advised that she would need to obtain

separate counsel if she intended to pursue Bill Shore and that she declined to do so because it would
be futile. Thus, Bokides' argument that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages as a matter
oflaw because she retained the same law firm as Bill Shore is completely erroneous and completely
disregards the undisputed testimony of Roberta Shore. Bokides is asking this Court to second guess
all of these subjective considerations by Roberta Shore even though Bokides himself has not been
\Nilling to incur additional fees and expenses in pursuing Bill Shore.
2.

Roberta Shore's Undisputed Personal Knowledge of Bill Shore's Assets and
Liabilities.

In this case, Robe11a Shore, who unlike a third party creditor, has direct and personal
knowledge of the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore because she was married to him for fifteen years,
she was personally involved in the transactions and/or purchases of many of the assets Bill Shore
currently holds and she was personally involved in many of the lawsuits and/or judgments currently
against Bill Shore.

Despite such undisputed evidence and testimony of Roberta Shore, Bokides

suggests that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages because she "could have" taken certain
steps such as:
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Propound written discovery to Bill to discover the current state of his assets;
Take depositions of persons with knowledge of Bill's assets;
Send subpoenas to all institutions or banks that may have knowledge of Bill's wealth
or assets;
Conduct an asset search to determine assets he may have or may be concealing;
Conduct a title search for any and all real property owned by Bill;
Retain an expert to appraise the current value of the property owned by Bill as of the
time McCormick filed its complaint.

Third Party Defendant's Closing Argument, pgs. 7-8.
Notwithstanding the fact that all of these speculative actions would require Roberta Shore
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL REPLY BRIEF- 6

~I

to incur additional expenses and legal fees, Bokides is disregarding the undisputed testimony that
Roberta Shore already has personal knowledge of Bill Shore's assets. There is no need for Roberta
Shore to propound discovery to Bill Shore to discover his current state of assets, take depositions,
subpoena institutions or banks, or conduct an asset or title search because she already has personal
knowledge of the state of his assets and liabilities. Essentially, Roberta Shore has done all of the
things Bokides is suggesting she could have done as a result of her own personal knowledge.
Roberta Shore's undisputed testimony regarding her know ledge of Bill Shore's assets and liabilities
should not be disregarded by the Court and Bokides' second guessing of the evidence does not meet
his burden.
C.

Bill Shore's Net Worth.

Bokides spends a significant amount of effort second guessing and arguing regarding Bill
Shore's net worth.

Bokides goes so far as to engage in rank speculation as to the value of Bill

Shore's assets and to even speculate that some outstanding liabilities owed to the law firm Merrill
and Merrill and Bill Shore's aunt will not be executed upon or the loans will not be required to be
repaid. Bokides has not presented any evidence in the way of appraisals or experts to contradict the
testimony of Bill Shore as to the value of his assets, and Bokides certainly has not presented any
testimony from anyone to suggest that the liability owed to Merrill and Merrill or to Eliminor Harper
will not be collected. Bokides request that this Court also engage in such speculation does not meet
his burden of proving that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages.
Bokides also asserts that the value of the Council ranch should be more because Bill Shore
has attempted to sell the property for more. However, this disregards the undisputed testimony that
the property was purchased for less than $600,000 and the highest offer ever received for the
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property was for $900,000.

Further, Bill Shore testified that the assets listed on the financial

statement were ambitious and actual values based upon a forced sale would be much less.
Bokides suggests that based upon his speculation as to the value of assets and liabilities, Bill
Shore has a positive net worth. Bokides, however, fails to account for the fact that Bill Shore now
has a judgment in favor of McCormick in excess of $340,000. Thus, even if one accepts Bokides
speculation and disregard of the actual testimony and evidence presented at trial, Bill Shore has a
negative net worth. The bottom line is that second guessing and arguing whether Bill Shore's net
worth is positive or not does not meet his burden of proving that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate
her damages.
III. CONCLUSION
Bokides concludes by suggesting that Roberta Shore is inappropriately trying to place the
blame on Bokides.

This is an interesting position given that Bokides acknowledges that he

negligently failed to send written notice terminating the personal guarantees as he agreed to do so
and that Roberta Shore would not have a $342,000.00 judgment against her but for his negligence.
Bokides continues to have the audacity to blame his former client for his own negligence and failure
to act.
Moreover, Robena Shore was well within her rights to make a subjective determination as
to the collection of any claim she may have against Bill Shore, and based upon her personal
knowledge o fhis assets and liabilities, along with the inherent risks, expenses and uncertainties with
any litigation, it was not unreasonable for her to chose not to pursue such a claim. Bokides'
invitation that this Court speculate as to the merits of any claim Roberta Shore may have against Bill
Shore and to speculate as to the net worth of Bill Shore does not meet his burden of proving that
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Roberta Shore failed to mitigate.
DATED this [}day of September, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

;;;:Mif:U·i CSJNTY CLE-RK

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

jft

****"'*'
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
IN-C.,. a corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation;. WILLIAM R. SHORE, an.
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
in~vidual,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-2008-327

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,

Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant.
This action came before the Court for a one (1) day court trial on.August 24-, 2010. The
Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore ("Roberta''), was represented by James G: Reid. The ThirdParty Defendant, Nicholas Bokides ("Bokides'') was represented by Bradley J. Williams; At the
conclusion of trial the Court entered a Minute Entry and Order setting forth a post trial briefing

schedule. Pursuant to this order the parties were instructed to submit post trial arguments along
with their proposed :findings of fact and conclusions of law. The i;,arties submitted the requested

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· 1

LE 8 'ON

AlNnOJ Nil~N~~~:01
~dSl:n OlOl 'Sl 'AON

post trial filings and the Court took this matter under advisement. The Court now enters its Findings
of Fact; Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to Idaho Rule ofCivil
Procedure 52(a).
SUMMARY OF CASE

This case involves Roberta's third party claim of attorney malpractice. Roberta a1ieges

that she retained Bokides to represent her interest in a divorce proceeding involving her then
husband William Shore (William). Incident to this representation in the divorce proceeding,
Roberta claims that she instructed Bokides to write letters to Agricredit revoking the personal
guarantees she had previously given

to

guarantee the debts of a business owned by her and.

William, known as Bear River Equipment, Inc. (Bear River). Bokides acknowledges that said

letters. were never sent to Agricredit or McCormick. This matter proceeded to trial on the issue
of Bokides directive from his client Roberta to terminate the guarantees- and the particulars of
that directive, including but not limited to when the directive

was given, and the time

requirements associated with its performance.
Bokides, at trial, filed Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides Motion to Amend
Answer. This- motion attached a proposed amended answer and a Memorandum in Support of
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer.

Roberta objected to

Bokides' request for leave of court to file an amended answer and the matter was argued to the
Court, the morning: of trial. The sole basis asserted by Bokides for amending his answer to the
third party complaint was to assert an affirmative defense alleging that Roberta had failed to
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mitigate her damages. 1 See Tenth Affirmative Defense in Third-Party Defendant Nicholas

Bold.des' [Proposed] Amended Answer to Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
attached as Exhibit '"A" to Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Am.end Answer.
Bokides presented evidence at trial in support of his contention that Roberta should. be barred

from recovering damages from him, arising out of his alleged malpractice, because she failed to
mitigate her damages. The contention is that Roberta should have sued William under the hold.
harmless provisions arising out of their divorce. These hold harmless provisions require "pay
when due" and to "hold. [Roberta) harmless" from the debts of Bear River.
BOKIDES~ MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
The Court will first address Boki.des' motion to amend bis answer.2 Rule 15(a) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the ability, if any, of a party to file amended or
supplemental pleadings. This rule provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[O}therwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires.

1

The Court took this matter under advisement and advised the parties that it would- issue its ruling on this motion at
the time it issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the trial proceeding. The Court allowed Roberta a
continuing. objection to the affirmative defense in. question as well as any evidence relating to the mitigation of
damages issue. The Court also ordered that any presentation of evidence by Roberta concemini; this affirmative
defense would not be deemed a waiver of her objection, but was merely being offered in defense of the aff1rmative
defense in the event the Court were to ultimately grant Bokides' motion to amendhls answer.
2
Although Bokides refers to Rule lS(b) of the Idaho llules of Civil Procedure in his Memorandum in Support of
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer, this Court:will only address and analyze this
motion under I.R.C.P.. 15(a), I.R.C.P. lS'(b) is only applicable when issues are "not raised by the pleadings [but] are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties." In this case Roberta raised her objection to this defense at the
summary judgment stase and continued to assert her objection at the time of the hearing, on the montlng of trial, and
during the cours~ of trial by requesting from the Court and receivini; a. continuing objection to evidence and
testimony related. to mitigation of damages, The objection was specifically that mitigation had never been raised as
an affirmative defense in. Bokides' initial answer: As such the: Court concludes that lR.C.P. 15(b) has no
application in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 3
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In addressing a motion to amend pleadings, the determination concerning_ whether to allow the
moving party to am.end its pleading is left to the trial court's. discretion. ·Indian Springs v, Indian

Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 750, 215 P.3d 457, 470 (2009) (Indian Springs), In Indian
Springs the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the trial court's discretion as follows:
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion,. we look at: "(1)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion, and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.,"

Id
Both I.R.C.P. 15(a) and the case interpreting this rule- establish that trial courts should be
liberal in granting motions to amend pleadings. This policy of liberality was addressed in Iron

Eagle v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 13S Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003) (Iron Eagle). In Iron
Eagle the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows:
A court should liberally grant a motion to amend a complaint, Hayward v, Valley
Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (2001) .. The purpose
behind allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on
their merits and to provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue. Car,· JI
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197,
1202 (1999).

Id at 492.

In the present case, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion and in applying the liberal
standard. of freely allowing amendments when justice requires, will allow Bokides' amended
answer to be filed in this proceeding. The policy of allowing cases to be adjudicated on. their
merits supports the Court's conclusion in this respect Roberta has been on notice since the
briefing. and arguments at the summary judgment stage of this litigation that Bokides was
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asserting the defense of failure to mitigate damage. Bokides' motion for summary judgment and
supporting memorandum were filed on March 12, 2010. This matter did not proceed to trial until
August 24, 2010, As such Roberta had notice of this defense at least five months in advance of
trial. She prepared and defended against this defense at summary judgment. She had adeq_uate

notice and an opportunity to prepare and defend against this affirmative defense matter for trial
purposes.

mfact, this Co~ in denying the parties' respective motions for summary judgment,

advised the parties that this was one of the issues that-the Court found th.ere to be genuine issues
of material fact which necessitated trial. As such, this Court cannot fmd that Roberta is in any
way prejudiced by Bokides request to amend his answer in order to assert this defense. Further:,
the Court finds that in keeping with the policy of allowing cases to proceed to trial on the merits
and the lack of prejudice to Roberta, that justice does require that the Court GRANT Third-Party
Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer. As such, the Court will DIRECT the
Clerk of Franklin County Court to file Bokides' Amended Answer to Third-Party Complaint

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Robertaand William were marriedfodifteenyears from 1991 through2006. William

and Roberta were divorced on November 16, 2006. Duringthe course of their marriage William
and Roberta acquired and established a business knovm as Bear River Equipment, Inc. ("Bear
River"), Bear River sold farm equipment and machinery, including machinery and products
manufactured by McCormick International USA, Inc. (McCormick).

2. McCormick is a manufacturer of farm equipment. In order to market its equipment,
McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships with local, but independently owned dealers.
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In 2005, a dealership with Bear River was created for the retail sale ofMcCormick tractors and
other farm equipment.
3. In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River

entered into agreements with Agricredit Acceptance LLC (Agricredit) which were executed by

William. and Roberta on behalf of Bear River, Bear River executed an ''Inventory Security
Agreement" and a "Retail Financing Agreement" with Agricredit on March 22, 2005. As part of
the Inventory Security Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited power of attorney
which provided Agricredit with the authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River-, certain.
documents in the normal course of business, including "Wholesale Financing- Requests and
Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm equipment from McConnick, the equipment would
be financed or floored through Agricredit Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed
by Bear River through the use ofthe limited power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to
the customer, the proceeds of the sale were to be placed in a trust account, separate and apart
from Bear River's other funds.
4,

On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal

guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear
River to Agricredit.
5. The Guaranty signed by Roberta contained the following provision:
And that this shall. be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the liabilities
which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall have received at its
Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor or the executor, administrators,
successors or assigns of the Guarantor, to make no further advances on the
security of this guaranty.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDl!:R • 6
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6. In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling
equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply
said proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to piace said monies in a trust account as required
by the agreements with Agricredit.
. . 7: On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William and
Roberta in their individual capacities. McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20,
2010. McConnick's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted June 10, 2010. Judgment was
entered against Bear River, William and Roberta on June 29, 2010 in the sum of $319,977.98.
On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded to McCormick and an Amended
Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42.
8. The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from the
sale of this equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the agreements between
Bear River and Agricredit. The Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized
as follows:
Serial No.

Model No.

Date Financed

JJE2026767

MC 115 Tractor

10/23/06

JJE3337250

MTX135 Tractor.

12/21/06

JJE333-7193

MTX120 Tractor

12/21/06

7183970

MCQL145 Loader

12/21/06

JJE2059356

CX105 Tractor

1/04/07

JJE2058843

CXSS Tractor

3/15007
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L .d

LE 8 'ON

NM0~8 380111

7217799

MCQL165 Loader

5/29/07

7217796

MCQL165 Loader

5/29/07

9. One of the eight (8) pieces of equipment was financed prior to William and Roberta's
divorce. The tractor financed before the finalization of the divorce· was financed in the amount
. of $48,146.54. See Defendant's Exhibit 203. The amount claimed due in the demand letter to
Roberta was $43,331.89. 3 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 105. The remaining seven (7) items were all
financed after the divorce,

10. fn March, 2006, William and Roberta separated. Roberta engaged Bokides to
represent her in the divorce proceeding. Roberta met with Bokides on three (3) occasions
between March, 2006 when the parties separated- and. May, 2006. During the course of these
three (3) meetings with Bokides, Roberta testified that she provided Bokides with documents
relatin~ to Bear River. Among these documents were three (3) guaranteea William and Roberta
had signed on behalf of Bear River, one of these three (3) guarantees was the guarantee with
Agricredit. Roberta testified and this Court accepts her testimony that the latest she would have
brought the guarantees to Bokides would have been the last of the three (3) initial meetings in
May, 2006.
11. During one of these three (3) meetings which occurred. between March and May of
2006, Roberta asked that she be removed from anything concerning Bear River and that the
business and the real property where the business was located be given to William in the divorce
proceeding. Roberta also testified and the Court finds as true her testimony that in one of the

3

Bokides did not put on any evidence at trial concerning. how much of the ultimate judgJ1lent entered against Bear
River; William and Roberta was attributable to interest on principal amount of this one tractor which was financed
before the divorce was final
·
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three (3) meetings between March and May 2006 that she asked Bokides to notify Agricredit and
McCormick in writing that she wished to terminate her obligation under the guarantees.
12. Both Roberta and Bokides testified that Bokides agreed to so notify Agricredit and
McCormick in writing of her decision to terminate the personal guarantees.

Roberta also

testified that .this consent occurred during one of the three (3) meetings between March,· 2006 and
May 2006. 4-

13. There was no specific date or timeline discussed between Roberta and Bokides
concerning when this notification of termination in writing to Agricredit and McCormick would
occur. Roberta testified at the time the divorce was being initiated that there were no exigent
circumstances regarding Bear River and its finances that caused her concern or a desire for
immediate. removal. However, Roberta testified that she did not see why Bokides could not have.
sent the letters to Agricredit and McCormick immediately. She also acknowledged upon cross
examination that she expected that the letters terminating the guarantees would be accomplished
during the course of the divorce and that it would all be done by the time. the divorce was
completed.
14.

Bold.des did not send the letters he was instructed to send to Agricredit or

McConnick revoking Roberta's personal guarantees.
15. The parties' Divorce Decree was entered on November 16, 2006.
4

Although Bokides did not dispute the fact that he agreed to write the. letters, he did contend that he declined to
write them until the. divorce was concluded, Bokides' testimony regarding the timing of his -performance was that it
would not be. done until after the divorce was finalized, However, the. Court does not accept this version of the
events. Roberta denies that Bokides ever discussed with her that he had concerns about this request or that he
declined to perform this_ request until after the divorce was fmalized. In fact, she testified that in meetings with
Bo.kides after she received a demand letter from McConnick- for payment under the Guaranty, Bokides never
suggested- that he. had refused to tender the written notification regarding terminating the guarantees until after
divorce. She testified that the first time she learned of this position was when Bokides filed his affidavit in June of
201 O, The Court finds Roberta's testimony in this respect mote credible.
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16. One of the provisions of the parties' Divorce Decree requires William to defend and
hold Roberta harmless from any indebtedness "related to the closely held corporation Bear River

Farm Equipment, Inc., including but not limited to, any claims or litigation against the parties
arising out of the business operated by Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc. including attorney fees
and co!rts." See Decree of Divorce, Exhibit 103.
17. In August 2007, Roberta Shore received a demandletterrelative to the guarantee she
had signed with Agricredit. This is when Roberta first discovered that Bokides had failed to

send written notice terminating her from the Agricredit Guaranty. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 105.

18. Despite the hold harmless provision contained in her decree of divorce Roberta
testified that she believed suing William pursuant to the hold harmless clause was a futile act and
would not result in he~ being-held harmless. Rather, she testified it would increase her damages
by inquiring additional attorney fees and the expenses necessary to obtain a judgment that she

believed would not be collectable.
19. Roberta, as a result of fifteen years of marriage to William and being the bookkeeper
regarding their per~onal assets and affairs, was intimately aware of the assets, liabilities,
judgments and pending lawsuits of the community. Roberta was also aware of those same
assets, liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits after the divorce. In fact, Roberta held a first
mortgage on the Council Ranch and was a. party to some of the lawsuits.
20. Both Roberta and William testified as to William's assets, liabilities, judgments and
'

pendinglawsuits as follows:
a. McCormick Judgment in the amount of $342,417.00
b. Farm Financial Statement (Exhibit 113)
i.
Attorney fees owed to:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· 10

0 l .d

LS8 ·01~

NM0~8 38onr

• Blake Atkin P.d. in the. amount of $45,337.92 See also
Exhibit 108.
• Merrill and Merrill in the amount of $66A00.31 See also
Plaintiffs Exhibit 109.
• Sparrow &Kunz in the amount of $4,200.00,
c. Outstanding obligation to the Internal Revenue Service and the Idaho State
Tax Commission for payroll taxes, high.way taxes, sales tax. and/or use tax
in excess of$300,000 with potential for personal liability. See Plaintiffs
Exhibit 106, 107 and 113.
d. Council Ranch was purchased fo:t $700,000 and listed on the fmancial
statement as having a value. of $1,625 million but in a forced_ Sheriffs sale
the value would be seriously decreased and at the most would be worth no
more than the mortgage currently assessed on the property.
i. Only one viable offer has been. made on the Council Ranch since
the parties were divorced in the amount of $900,000.00. No other
viable offers have been made. The Council Ranch is subject to a
first mortgage to Roberta Shore in the amount of$1.3 million. See
Plaintiffs Exhibit 110, 112 and 113.
e. The Preston Property was purchased for $120,000 and_ is listed on the
financial statement as having a value of $220,000 but in a forced Sheriffs
sale the val~ would be seriously decreased and at the most would. be
worth. no more than the mortgage currently assessed on the property. See
Plaintiffs Exhibit 111.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.· tegalMalpractice

To establish a claim for legal malpractice, a claimant must prove (1) it had an attomeyM
client relationship; (2) the existence: of a duty on the part of the attorney; (3) that the attorney
breached that duty; (4) that the attorney's failure to perform the duty proximately caused
damages. Spur Products Corp. v Stoel Rives, LLP, 14:! Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158, 1162(2007),
In Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 172, 868 P.2d 496, 500 (1994) (Sohn) the Idaho Supreme Court
addressed the measure of damages in an attorney malpractice action by citing to the case of

Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1977) "the trier of fact in the malpractice
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action must decide what the outcome would have been in the underlying action if the lawyer had
performed properly.''
In the present action the Court concludes that Roberta and Bo.kides entered into an
attorney client relationship in March of 2006. The purpose of that attorney client relationship
was to provide services to Roberta in the dissolution of her marriage to William and all matters

incident to that dissolution. Incident to that attorney client relationship Bokides agreed to notify
Agricredit and McCormick in writing that Roberta was terminating the guarantees she had
previously signed, This attorney client relationship and the agreement between Roberta and
Bokides required that he send letters to Agricredit and McCormick incident to his representation
of Roberta. This created a legal duty on Bold.des part to write said letters to Agricredit and
McCormick terminating the guarantees.
No timeframe was established between the parties concerning the performance of this
obligation Bokides assumed on behalf of Roberta. In Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas.

Ins. Ca., 149 Idaho 299, _, 233 P.3d.1221, 1240 (2010) (Weinstein) the Idaho Supreme Court
restated the well established rule in Idaho that "where no time is expressed in a contract for its
performance, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined
by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending
the performance,"
In the present case, the Court: concludes that it was reasonable for Bokides to conclude
that this directive was part of the overall dissolution of the marital relationship. The documents

regarding the guarantee and Bear River were delivered to him at the same time. Roberta's stated
objective. in the divorce, in part, was that William receive Bear River and the assets and liabilities
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associated with that business. The Court concludes that it was consistent with those goals that as
part of the dissolution of the marital relationship, that business be transferred to William along
with the obligations and liabilities associated with the same. It also seems ·logical for Bokides to
conclude that as part of his responsibilities of transitioning the business and its assets and
liabilities to William that he would need to send the letters terminating Roberta's guarantees to
Agricredit and McConnick as part of the dissolution process. As such, this Court concludes that
a. "reasonable time for performance" taking into account the factors enunciated in Weinstein was
that Roberta's termination letters be sent to Agricredit and McCormick before the divorce was
concluded, November 16, 2006.
Bokides never sent the letters terminating the guarantees to either Agricredit or
McCormick as. he was obligated to do during the performance of his duties as counsel for
Roberta. As a result Bokides breached his duty to Roberta.
This failure to send the letters on the part ofBokides was a proximate cause of Roberta's
being sued under the guarantees and the resultant judgment against Roberta in favor of
McCormi.ck.
This Court has concluded that the "reasonable time" for Bokides to have performed
would have been by the conclusion of the divorce. Because the portion of the McCormick
Judgmentthatrelated to the tractorthatwas financed prior to November 16, 2007, that portion of
the judgment was not proximately caused by Bokides' breach. However, the remaining seven
(7) pieces of farm equipment which were financed by Bear River after the parties' divorce and

that portion of the McConnick Judgment related to them were proximately caused by Bok.ides'
breach. In considering the language of the Idaho Supreme Court found in Sohn, supra., this
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Court can reach no other conclusion. Had Bokides timely performed his obligation incident to
his representation of Roberta in this dissolution proceeding she would not have had a judgment
entered against her personall:y for seven. (7) of these fann implements floored and financed by
Bear River through Agricredit.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the tractor, serial number JJE2026767, and the
judgment entered against Roberta for the same was not proximately caused by Bokides'
malpractice, The sum claimed by McCormick in the demand letter dated August 30 1 2007
relative to this tractor was $43,331.89. As was stated in the Findings of Fact, footnote 3 because
there was no evidence separating out what portion ofthe McCormick Judgment was attributable
to interest on this tractor, the Court cannot r~duce the judgment by that amount.
Therefore, this Court concludes that $299,085.53 ofthe$342,417.42judgmentin favor of
McCormick against Roberta was a proximate result ofBokides' breach. Therefore, Roberta was
damaged in the amountof$299,085.53 when the: McConnick Judgment was entered.
Z. Failure to Mitigate Damages

Bokides has asserted as an affirmative defense that Roberta's recovery should be barred
due to her failure to mitigate damages. A defendant who asserts this_ affirmative defense bears
the burden of proof on this issue. Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129, 136, 910 P.2d 801, 808
(Ct.App. 1996) (Whitehouse).
Bokides argues that the evidence introduced at trial establishes that Roberta. should be
barred from recovering damages because she failed to attempt to recover from William. The
evidence clearly established thatincidentto the dissolution of the parties' marriage William was
obligated to pay the debts of Bear River. It was also established that he would hold Roberta
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harmless for any of the debts of Bear River. The evidence at trial also established that Roberta

had made no attempt

to

enforce this post divorce obligation against William. It is from this

failure that Bokides argues Roberta has failed to mitigate her damages.
I.n defense of Bokides' affirmative defense, Roberta has argued that she "acted

reasonably in electing not to pursue William. She also argues that this personal guarantee. was
not a debt arising from Bear River but that it was her own personal obligation and that she
therefore had no ability to require that William hold her harmless or indemnify her with respect
to

this debt. The Court need not address the latter of these two positions based upon its

conclusions oflaw regarding the first argument.
IDil 9.14 contains the pattern jury instruction for mitigation of damages. It provides as

follows:
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the

damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to
exercise such care cannot be recovered.
The issue of mitigation of damages has been specifically addressed.. in the case of O'Neil v.

Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Ct.App.1990) (O'Neil). In O'Neil the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated as follows:
"If an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with

an alternative remedy or remedies which are both viable and equh'alent, the
result may be that the client suffers no loss or a. reduced loss as the proximate
cause of the attorney's negligent conduct." Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W,2d
654, 658 (N.D.1989). Here, O'Neil had a duty to mitigate' the damages he could
have suffered by Vasseur and Gissel's breach of the attorney-client relationship
contract O'Neil did so. He pursued the Schuckardt case: pro se and was awarded
damages therein. Therefore, due to O'Neil's pursuits, no compensable damages
arose from the breach of contract by Vasseur and Gissel. [Bold Emphasis Added]

118 Idaho at 262-63.
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I
The Court finds the language in both IDJI 9.14 and O'Neil very insightful and helpful in
addressing the mitigation issue in the present controversy. IDJl 9.14 provides that one "must
exercise ordinary care to prevent damage and minimize future damage" and O'Neil provides if
''an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with an alternative

remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result may be that the client suffers
no loss as the proximate loss of the attorneys negligent conduct."
In this case, applying the facts as testified to by Roberta and William as well as the
documentary evidence introduced at trial, this Court cannot conclude that Roberta's
determination not to pursue William was not an exercise of ordinary care. Rather it seems to
have been a knowing and intelligent decision based upon her, knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding- his finances. In fact, had she spent many thousands of dollars pursuing William just
to obtain an uncollectable judgment, one might argue under the same principle of mitigation that

she failed to mitigate her damages by pursuing a lawsuit, which would likely be an element of
damage in her malpractice action,. with no hope ofrecovering the mone'y.
Therefore, this Court concludes based upon the facts of this case that Roberta did not
have "alternative remedies" which were "both viable and equivalent." Rather she was faced with
the prospect of incumng additional expenses and attorney fees to pursue what she knew to be a
judgment proof individual from her own personal knowledge arising qut of her fifteen year
marriage and the finances associated with the dissolution of that marriage.
This Court concludes that Roberta's actions in this- respect were taken in the exercise of
due care. The Court declines Bokides' request to bar or reduce Roberta's damages in this matter:
The Courtfmds this case to be somewhat analogous with the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
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in. Whitehouse. In Whitehouse, the buyers of 0.- broodmare brought an action against sellers, after
it was discovered that the mare could not reproduce. The sellers asserted the affirmative defense
of mitigation alleging that buyers should have taken the mare to a reproductive center or had
fertility testing conducted. However, the Court ofAppeals in ruling on this issue stated:
, However, at trial, he did not present evidence that such evaluation likely would
have led to a cure: for the mare's .infertility, nor did he show the probable cost of
such testing. Therefore, Lange didnot satisfy his burden to prove:that Revelation.
Prophecy could have been restored to fitness as a broodmare and the
Whitehouses' damages thereby lessened. Because there is insufficient evidence to
support a.finding in favor of Lange on his allegation that the Whitehouses failed
to mitigate damages, the absence of a finding by the trial court on this defense
will be disregarded.
128 Idaho at 136. Utilizing the same rationale, this Court concludes Bokides did not
present sufficient evidence at trial that Roberta's pursuit of William would have lead to a

.

.

collectible judgment that would have satisfied or- decreased her liability to McConnick.

Rather the evidence at trial and this Court's findings of fact support the opposite
conclusion that

it would only have added to the already disastrous financial status of

William and placed Roberta in line with a handful of other creditors attempting to collect
money and judgments against him.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby ORDERS that Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend

Answer is GRANTED and the Franklin County Clerk shall accept and file this
document
The Court finds that Bokides breached his duty to send letters to Agricredit and
McCon;nick terminating Roberta's guarantees. That as a result of this breach Roberta has
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suffered damages in the sum of $299,085.S3 plus interest on this amount from the date of
judgment at the statutory rate. The Court finds that Roberta did not fail to mitigate her
damages in this matter- and therefore Bok:ides affirmative defense is DENIED.

Finally, based upon the foregoing the Court finds Roberta to be the prevailing
parcy, in 1;his litigation.
Upon the submission of an appropriate form of judgment the Court will sign the

same.
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420 Memorial Drive
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Telephone (208) 522-6700
Facsimile (208) 522-5111
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DATED this JS_ day ofNovember, 2010~

V, ELLIOT LARSEN
Clerk ofthe District Court
By:
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

McCORcv11CK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,
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THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
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ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
VS.

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant,

COMES NOW the third-party defendant, Nicholas Bokides, by and through
undersigned counsel, and as his answer to the Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
responds and alleges as follows.
FIRST DEFENSE

I.
Third-Party Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and therefore should be dismissed.
SECOND DEFENSE

II.
Third-Party Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Third-Party
Complaint that is not specifically and expressly admitted in this answer.

III.
Third-Party Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraphs 1,2, 3, and 4 of the
Third-Party Complaint.
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IV.
Responding to Paragraph 5 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant
states that the personal guarantee speaks for itself. All other allegations contained therein are
denied.
V.
Responding to Paragraph 6 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant
states that Third-Party Plaintiff delivered a letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation for
mailing by Third-Party Defendant. All other allegations contained therein are denied.
VI.

Responding to Paragraph 7 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant
states that he failed to mail Third-Party Plaintiffs letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation as
requested. Third-Party Defendant denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph.
VII.

Responding to Paragraph 8 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant
states that the allegations are a matter or record and further states that he lacks sufficient
information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations and therefore denies
the same.
VIII.

Third-Party Defendant lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a
belief as to the truth of Paragraph 9 of the Third-Party Complaint and therefore denies the same.

IX.
Third-Party Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 10 of the Third-Party
Complaint.

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOKIDES' AMENDED ANSWER TO
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X.
Responding to Paragraph 11 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant
states that he failed to mail Third-Party Plaintiffs letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation as
requested. Third-Party Defendant denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph.
XI.

Third-Party Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the
Third-Party Complaint.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XII.

Recovery against the Third-Party Defendant is barred because no act or omission
of the Third-Party Defendant caused or contributed to any of Third-Party Plaintiffs alleged
inJuries or damages.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XIII.

Third-Party Plaintiffs damages, if any, were proximately caused by the
negligence or fault of parties, persons or entities other than the Third-Party Defendant, including
the Third-Party Plaintiff. The negligence or fault of all persons must be compared under the
comparative negligence laws of the state ofldaho. In asserting this defense, the Third-Party
Defendant does not admit that he was guilty of any negligent or culpable conduct and, to the
contrary, expressly denies any such conduct on his part.
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XIV.
Third-Party Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

xv.
Third-Party Plaintiffs action is prematurely brought and is not ripe for
adjudication.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XVI.
Third-Party Plaintiffs former spouse, William R. Shore, agreed to pay when due
and indemnify and hold Third-Party Plaintiff harmless from all indebtedness related to Bear
River Equipment, Inc., including attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, William R. Shore is the
person primarily responsible for Third-Party Plaintiffs injuries alleged in the Third-Party
Complaint.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XVII.
Third-Party Plaintiffs claims, or some of them, are barred to the extent they are
beyond the scope of Third-Party Defendant's representation.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XVIII.
Third-Party Plaintiffs damages, if any, are subject to the limitation on noneconomic damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1603.
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XIX.
Third-Party Defendant met the standard of practice applicable to him as an
attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho. At the time and place of the alleged
malpractice, and at all times, Third-Party Defendant used reasonable care and diligence in the
exercise of his judgment, skill, and the application of his learning in accordance with his best
judgment and the consent of Third-Party Plaintiff. Third-Party Defendant in no way breached or
deviated from the standard of care.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

xx.
Third-Party Plaintiff's claims may be barred by the statute of limitations.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XXI.
Third-Party Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
XXII.
By raising the above defenses, Third-Party Defendant makes no admission of any
kind and does not assume any burdens of proof or production not otherwise properly resting
upon him in this lawsuit. Rather, Third-Party Defendant merely identifies defenses to preserve
them for all proper uses under applicable law. Third-Party Defendant has yet to complete
discovery in this case, the result of which may reveal additional defenses to the Third-Party
Plaintiff's Complaint. As such, Third-Party Defendant reserves the right to supplement, modify,
or delete defenses after discovery is completed.
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WHEREFORE, Third-Party Defendant prays for judgment:
1.

Dismissing the Third-Party Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice, without

granting any of the relief requested against the Third-Party Defendant;
2.

Awarding Third-Party Defendant his reasonable costs and attorney fees

incurred in defending this action;

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this

L

day of August, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK

&

FlELDS, CHARTERED

&/t_

By_ _~ - - - - - - - - - - - Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2010, I caused a trne
and correct copy of the foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOK.IDES'
AMENDED ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Steven R. Fuller
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE

24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83262
Attorney for Plaintiff
James G. Reid
Laura E. Burri
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED

455 S. Third
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, lD 83701-2773
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Attorneys/or Defendcmts and
Third-Partv Plaintiff Roberta Shore
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Chambers Copy

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Bradley J Williams
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JAMES G. REID, ISB #1372
S. BRYCE FARRIS, ISB #5636
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 S. Third, P. 0. BOX 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Attorneys for Defendants
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*
*

MCCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation

)

case No. cv 08-327

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

VS.

)

BEAR RIVER EQUIPIVIEI\JT, 11\JC., a
corporation, WILLIAM R. SHORE an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

--

-- ---- -------- -- -- --- - -- --- ---------- -- - -------------------

)

-- ------

)
)

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,

)
)

Third-Party Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

JUDGME~IT -1

JLIDGME~IT

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.
*
*
*

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Memorandum Decision and Order entered November 15, 2010, and good cause
appearing for the relief set forth herein;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be and is hereby
entered in favor of the Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore, and against Third-Party
Defendant, Nicholas Bokides, in the amount of $299,085.53, plus interest on this
amount from the date of Judgment at the statutory rate.
DATED this

2.1

~ay of November, 2010.

)

/~/f'///:7,/I/

;;3/Vivi(/~/ ;,rz//. IPJt~~
Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was served upon all parties listed below by:
() U. S. mail, postage prepaid
( ) hand delivery

( ) express mail
( ) facsimile

Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83262
Ed Cather
Moffatt, Thomas
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-1505
James G. Reid
s. Bryce Farris
Ringert Law Chartered
P.o. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701
-

'Ju1c&_ ~tp/zyJ
Clerk
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STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC .. , a corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. CV-2008-327

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

Defendants.

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on December 23, 2010 regarding Third-Party Plaintiff's
request for attorney fees and costs. James G. Reid appeared telephonically for and on behalf of the
Defendants and the Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore and Charles Edward Cather II appeared
telephonically for Third-Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides. No court reporter was available for this
hearing and the proceedings were recorded digitally only. All parties waived the presence of a court
reporter.
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The Court heard argument regarding said Motion and took this matter under advisement and
shall issue a decision in due course.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

December 23, 2010

;p;/,Ju}~ ~
MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 10, 2011, I mailed/served/faxed a true copy of the
foregoing document on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered.
Attorney( s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

James G. Reid
Attorney for Roberta Shore

Faxed: (208) 342-4657

Charles Edward Cather III
Attorney for Nicholas Bokides

Faxed: 522-5111

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN, Clerk
-

:
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bjw@moffatt.com
cec@moffatt.com
17136.0349
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR

McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,

COUNTY OF FRAJ{KLIN

Case No. CV 08-327

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL

VS.

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIAi\1 R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual.
Defendants.
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ROBER TA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party
Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS.

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third-Party
Defendant/Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ROBERTA SHORE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Nicholas Bokides, appeals against the above-

named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lmv,
and Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 15, 2010 and the Judgment entered

on November 30, 2010, in and for the County of Bonneville, Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
presiding.
2.

The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

final judgment described in Paragraph 1 is an appealable judgment under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule l l(a)(l).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant

intends to assert on appeal include:
•

Did the District Court err in finding that Roberta Shore mitigated her
damages?

•

Did Roberta Shore's failure to retain independent counsel prohibit her
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages because of a nonconsentable conflict of interest?

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
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•

Did the District Court err in declining to bar or reduce Roberta's damages
based on William Shore's duty to indemnify as set forth in the Divorce
Decree?

In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f), Appellant reserves the right to modify or amend
this list of issues, or to assert other issues.
4.

A reporter's transcript is requested. Appellant requests the preparation of

the following portions of the reporter's transcript: the standard reporter's transcript in entirety as
defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(c) supplemented by the following:
•

April 8, 2010 Hearing;

•

June 10, 2010 Hearing;

•

June 21, 2010 Hearing;

•

July 23, 2010 Hearing; and

•

August 24, 2010 Trial.

5.

Appellant requests those documents which are automatically included

under Idaho Appellate Rule 28 be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the
following documents be included in the clerk's record(dates are those on which the pertinent
documents were filed or served):
•

3/12/2010: Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

3/12/2010: Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

•

3/12/2010: Affidavit of Bradley J. Williams;

•

3/12/2010: Notice of Hearing;

•

3/24/2010: Roberta Shore's Response and Opposition to Third Party
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

3/24/2010: Affidavit of Bryce Farris;

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
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•

4/01/10: Third Party Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

4/8/10: Minute Entry and Order;

•

5/20/10: Notice of Hearing;

•

5/20/10: Affidavit of Jean Cosbey

•

5/20/10: Affidavit of Kevin Peters

•

5/20/10: Affidavit of Gregg Briggs

•

5/20/10: Motion for Summary Judgment

•

5/20/10: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment;

•

5/26/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

5/26/10: Memorandum in Support of Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment;

•

5/26/10: Affidavit of James G. Reid;

•

5/26/10: Notice of Hearing;

•

6/07/10: Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment;

•

6/11/10: Bokides' Memorandum in Opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

6/11/10: Affidavit of C. Edward Cather;

•

6/11/10: Affidavit of Nicholas T. Bokides;

•

6/14/10: Motion to Strike;

•

6/14/10: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

•

6/16/10: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike:

•

6/17/10: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike:

•

6/22/10: Minute Entry and Order;
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•

6/29/10: Judgment and Order;

•

7/29/10: Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment:

•

8/4/10: Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation;

•

8/13/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief;

•

8/13/10: Third Party Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief;

•

8/16/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Proposed Exhibit List:

•

8/17/10: Third Party Defendant's Exhibit List;

•

8/24/10: Minute Entry and Order;

•

8/24/10: Motion to Amend Answer;

•

8/24/10: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Answer;

•

9/7/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Final Argument;

•

9/7/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Post-Trial Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law;

•

9/14/10: Third Party Defendant's Proposed Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law;

•

9/14/10: Third Party Defendant's Closing Argument;

•

9/20/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Post-Trial Reply Brief; and

•

11/15/10: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum
Decision and Order; and

•

11/30/2010: Judgment.

6.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, Appellant requests that all tapes and

exhibits, including charts, graphs or other documents, offered and admitted during the
proceedings, whether hearing or trial, be included as exhibits to the record.
7.

I certify that:
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(a)

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

The court reporter of the district court has been sent the estimated

fee for the preparation of the reporter's transcript;
(c)

The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record is being

(d)

The Appellant's filing fees have been paid;

(e)

Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant

paid;

to Rule 20.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK&
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

c:&;c:2ciZ-

C. Edward Cather - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

James G. Reid
Laura E. Burri
RlNGERT LAW CHARTERED

455 S. Third
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Attorneys for Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Chambers Copy

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Steven R. Fuller
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE
24 North State
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83262
Attorney for Plaintiff

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Dorothy Snarr
Snarr Stenography and Transcription
POB 306
Grace, ID 83241

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

C. Edward Cather
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

or,at-,

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC .. , a corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.

Supreme Court No. _ _ _ _ __

BEAR RNER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Defendants.

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
NICHOLAS BOK.IDES, an individual
Third-Party Defendant.

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franldin County
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN

Case number from court: CV-2008-327
Order or judgment appealed from:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2010 and Judgment
dated November 30, 2010

Counsel for Appellants:

C. Edward Cather
MOFFATT TI-IOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS Chartered
PO BOX 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Counsel for Respondents:

James G. Reid
RINGERT LAW Chartered
PO Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773

Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Name of Court Reporter: TBD
Dated this 18th day of January, 2011.

SHA1)NA T. GEDDES, Clerk
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******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC .. , a corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 38454-2011
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent,

AMENDED
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

and
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants,
and
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third Party Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN

Case number from court: CV-2008-327
Order or judgment appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2010 and Judgment
dated November 30, 2010

AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

.

Counsel for Appellants:

C. Edward Cather
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS Chartered
PO BOX 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Counsel for Respondents:

James G. Reid
RINGERT LAW Chartered
PO Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773

Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Name of Court Reporter:

Linda Larsen
594 Randolph Avenue
Pocatello, ID 83201

Dated this 26th day of January, 2011.

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk

AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2

FILED

JAMES G. REID, ISB #1372
S. BRYCE FARRIS, ISB #5636
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 S. Third, P. 0. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, 11\J AND FOR THE COUI\JTY OF FRANKLIN

*
*
*

MCCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation

)

case No. cv 08-327

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

VS.

)

BEAR RIVER EQUIPMEI\JT, INC., a
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE an
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an
individual,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

------ ------ ------ --------------------------------------------------- )
)

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual,

)
)

Third-Party Plaintiff/
Respondent and crossAppellant,

I\JOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1

)

I\JOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

vs.

)
)

NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual,

)
)

Tri ird-Partv Defendant/
Appellant/CrossRespondent

TO:

)
)
)
*
*
*

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, NICHOLAS BOKIDES
AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, BRADLEY J.
WILLIAMS AND CHARLES EDWARD CATHER, 111,AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEl'J THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellant, Roberta Shores, appeals against the

above-named Cross-Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Laws, and Memorandum Decision and Order entered on
November 15, 2010 and the Judgment entered on November 30, 2010, in and for the
County of Bonneville, Honorable Mitchell W. Brown presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the Judgment or Orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(I), I.AR..
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Cross-

Appellant intends to assert on appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the Cross-Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal;
(a)

Did the District Court err in ruling that Roberta Shore's damages

did not include the amount due to McCormick for the tractor that was floored on or

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL· 2

<olfl

about October 28, 2007?
4.

An additional reporter's transcript is not requested.

5.

The Cross-Appellant requests the following documents to be included in

the Clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR., and
those designated by the Appellant in the initial Notice of Appeal: None.
6.

The Cross-Appellant requests the following documents, charts or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition
to those requested in the original Notice of Appeal: None.

/JcJ
Dated this4day
of January, 2011.

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _0l),day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was served upon al~i~s listed below by:

(1U. S. mail, postage prepaid
( ) hand delivery
Steven R. Fuller
Steven R. Fuller Law Office
24 North state
P.O. Box 191
Preston, ID 83262
Ed Cather
Moffatt, Thomas
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1505
Honorable Mitchell w. Brown
District Judge
159 south Main
Soda springs, ID 83276

I\JOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4

() express mail
( ) facsimile

FILED
1l JAN 28 PM ~: 24
_..
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC .. , a corporation
Plaintiff1/Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 38454-2011
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent,

SECOND AMENDED
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

and
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants,
and
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third Party Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN

Case number from court: CV-2008-327
Order or judgment appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2010 and Judgment
dated November 30, 2010

SECOND AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAfu({<.f

Counsel for Appellants:

C. Edward Cather

Counsel for Cross/Appellant: James G. Reid
Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: January 27, 2011
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Name of Court Reporter:

Linda Larsen
594 Randolph Avenue
Pocatello, ID 83201

Dated this 28th day of January, 2011.

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk

By
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~
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Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

SECOND AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC., a corporation
Plaintiff,
Supreme Court No. 38454-201 l
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327

vs.
ROBERTA SHORE, an individual
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent-Cross Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

and
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants,
and
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third Party Defendant-AppellantCross Respondent.

I, SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the following is a list of
exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during the hearing in this cause:

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL EXHIBIT BINDER
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S TRIAL EXHIBITS BINDER

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -

<3

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this

15

day of March, 20 I I.

SHAUNA T. GEDDES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By___._~.!.......:::::....::..._--'--....:..-=..1c....:....:._f-----=---------'-

Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKUN

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
fNC .. , a corporation
Plaintiff,
Supreme Court No. 38454-20 I I
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327

VS.

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent-Cross Appellant
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
and
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants,
and
NICHOLAS BOKlDES, an individual
Third Party Defendant-AppellantCross Respondent.

l, SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the aboveentitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as
required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL-

ID

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Preston,
ldaho, this

day of March, 2011.

SHAUNA T. GEDDES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By~~------------1~~Linda Hampton, Deputy C erk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA,
INC.., a corporation
Plaintiff,
Supreme Court No. 38454-2011
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327

VS.

ROBERTA SHORE, an individual
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent-Cross Appellant,
Certificate of Service
and
BEAR RJVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an
individual,
Defendants,
and
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual
Third Party Defendant-AppellantCross Respondent.

I, Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed,
by United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD to
each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

C. Edward Cather
Attorney for Appellants
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, TD 83405

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'

James G. Reid
Attorney for Respondents
PO Box2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this
day of March, 2011.

:JJ

SHAUNA T. GEDDES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By__
Linda Hampton, Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r.,

